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 Abstract 
 
 
The Coast Guard HH-65 helicopter experienced 31 in-flight loss of power 
incidents during FY 2003 and 21 during the first two months of FY 2003.  Concurrent 
with this apparent decrease in reliability, the Coast Guard seeks ways to expand the HH-
65’s Airborne Use of Force capabilities as a result of the September 11th, 2001 terrorists’ 
attacks. 
This study is an exploratory, empirical analysis of engine and airframe component 
replacements as related to engine mishaps and reliability in the HH-65.  We use 
contingency table analysis, ordinary least squares regression, and logistic regression to 
examine the mishap history and component replacement history of ten different HH-65 
components from 1997 through March of 2003.  Additionally, we examine the literature 
to determine the factors impeding improvements to the HH-65 powerplant. 
This study reveals three critical issues associated with the HH-65 powerplant, 
namely, lack of power reserve associated with the LTS-101-750, poor reliability 
associated with the fuel-control system, and excessive trouble removals due to excessive 
time between scheduled overhaul times.  Moreover, we find lack of funding and political 
pressure forcing the Coast Guard toward a less than optimum fix that could adversely 
affect overall mission effectiveness and Homeland Security.   
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AN ANALYSIS OF COAST GUARD HH-65 ENGINE RELIABILITY: 
A COMPARISON OF MALFUNCTIONS TO COMPONENT REMOVALS 
  
 
 
 I.  Introduction 
 
 
Overview 
The HH-65 Dolphin helicopter has been in service as the Coast Guard’s short-
range search and rescue helicopter since 1984.  During the early years of service, its 
engine, the Lycoming LTS-101, suffered from several reliability problems which were 
remedied by 1990 (Kandebo, 1990b:25).  However, the reliability of this engine has again 
come into question.  The HH-65 experienced 31 in-flight power loss events during fiscal 
year 2003, and 21 events during the first two months of fiscal year 2004; the later figure 
corresponds to approximately one event every three days (Couch, 2003a).  In the past 
year, the HH-65 helicopter experienced 61 power loss incidents per 100,000 flight hours.  
During the same period, the Coast Guard’s other helicopter, the HH-60J had zero 
incidents (CG PACAREA Oct 30, 2003).  RADM D. S. Belz, the Coast Guard Chief of 
Operations, has made the “safety and reliability of the H65 powerplant [the] number one 
priority for USCG aviation” (COGARD Oct 03, 2003). 
With the terrorists’ attacks of September 11th and the increased emphasis on 
Homeland Security, the Coast Guard’s mission of Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) has 
expanded.  As a result, the Coast Guard is looking to equip the HH-65 with various 
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Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capabilities.  These include use as a delivery vehicle for 
law enforcement boarding teams and installation of flexible mounted machine guns.  
These capabilities require a reliable and more powerful engine in order to allow for the 
necessary increase in the maximum gross weight of the HH-65 (Burgess, 2003).   
With a current inventory of 95 airframes, the Coast Guard owns and operates 
more HH-65s than any other type of aircraft.  The fleet of HH-65s accounts for 87,500 
hours of annual flight time and has accumulated over 750,000 total flight hours since 
1984 (Padfield, 2003).  Any problem associated with this critical asset has a negative 
impact on every Coast Guard mission.  As senior leaders within the Coast Guard aviation 
community struggle to meet the expanded mission requirements of the HH-65, they face 
an apparent decrease in reliability of the HH-65 engines.  Senior leaders cannot make an 
informed decision to upgrade the HH-65’s current engine or to purchase an entirely new 
engine without a full understanding of the problems that affect the current powerplant.  
Many of the engine malfunctions are attributable to an aging Anticipator System, which 
serves to match engine torques.  However, many experts believe that recent component 
faults within Fuel Governing System are masked by the Anticipator System (Serrano, 
2003).  This research assists decision makers in deciding which system – the Fuel 
Governing System or the Anticipator System - is causing the majority of engine 
malfunctions and whether to upgrade the current engine or purchase an entirely new 
engine for the HH-65.  This study also examines the history of the problem of inadequate 
power in the HH-65 and its impact on the mission effectiveness of the aircraft.  Finally, 
this study examines various cultural and political factors that have impeded 
improvements to the HH-65 powerplant.  
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Research Questions 
1.  Has the HH-65 become less reliable over time? 
 
• Has the number of engine malfunctions increased over time? 
 
• Is the age of the engine components a factor in the recent increase of engine-
related  mishaps?   
 
• Is the failure rate or mishap rate higher among older components? 
 
2.  What primary factors are driving failures in the LTS 101 engine? 
 
• Is there a correlation between certain malfunctions and specific components?  
 
• Is there a correlation between certain malfunctions and type of system?  
 
• Can more trouble removals be attributed to either the Anticipator System or Fuel 
Governing System? 
 
3.  Should the overhaul times be changed? 
 
• How often are components being removed for trouble?  For time? 
 
• Is the Time Since Overhaul at the time of failure a predictor of reliability? 
 
4.  What primary factors are impeding powerplant improvements of the HH-65? 
 
 
Methodology 
This study is an exploratory, empirical analysis of engine and airframe component 
replacements as related to the LTS 101 engine failure rates and reliability in the HH-65 
Dolphin.  This study also explores the history, background, and political issues associated 
with the upgrade and replacement of this engine.   
We answer research question one through an examination of trouble removals and 
mishaps over time.  We use contingency table analysis to compare component type and 
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number of trouble removals.  We compare the average age of a component to the number 
of trouble removals, number of mishaps, and overall reliability.   
We answer question two by examining the number of trouble removals by 
component and type of malfunction through contingency table analysis.  We also 
compare the number of trouble removals by system over time.  Finally, we examine the 
ratio of anticipator to fuel-governing system removals over time using Ordinary Least 
Squares.   
We answer question three by an initial comparison of time versus trouble 
removals by component and the Mean Time Since Overhaul to the Scheduled Time Since 
Overhaul.  We examine the predictive value of the Mean Time Since Overhaul and the 
Difference of the Mean Time Since Overhaul.  We use these variables in a logistic model 
to predict failure and in a linear model to predict Mean Time Between Failures.  Finally, 
using the average rate of increase over the last five years, we predict the number of 
trouble removals for 2003 and project a decline in trouble removals through a change in 
the Scheduled Overhaul Times.  We answer question four through an examination of the 
literature related to the HH-65 history and background.   
 
Scope 
 
 The scope of this study is limited to examination of the component replacement 
history of ten different HH-65 components from 1997 through March of 2003.  Engine 
failure and component failure analysis is limited to the same time period.  We examine 
two types of data as part of this study, engine-related mishap data and component 
replacement data.   
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Significance 
 
 This study provides Coast Guard senior leaders information that better enables 
them to make informed decisions concerning the future upgrade or replacement of the 
HH-65 powerplant.  By determining the significant limitations affecting the HH-65 and 
determining which components or systems are causing the majority of engine 
malfunctions, the Coast Guard can focus its efforts toward a fix or replacement on the 
critical failure point(s).  A fix of these failures and an increase in the reliability of the 
HH-65 engines will increase aircraft dispatch rates as well as safety and mission 
effectiveness for HH-65 aircrews. 
 
Thesis Overview 
 
Chapter One contains subject matter background, the research questions, and a 
brief description of the study.  Chapter Two contains a comprehensive review of the 
history and background of the HH-65, its mission requirements, power requirements, and 
weight growth.  Also discussed are the LTS-101 engine, engine alternatives, recent 
events, political issues, and the future of the HH-65 as it relates to this study.  Chapter 
Three discusses the research methodology used in this study, provides descriptive 
statistical information of the data gathered, an analysis of the collected data, and the 
findings from this analysis.  Finally, Chapter Four provides discussions, conclusions, 
recommendations, and suggestions for further research. 
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 II. Background 
 
 
 This chapter reviews the background and history of the HH-65 and the LTS-101 
engine.  We use the term HH-65 to include both the HH-65A and HH-65B, both of which 
are currently in use.  We specify the actual model – A or B –when necessary to address 
differences between the two.  Areas covered include the history and background of the 
Coast Guard HH-65, its mission requirements, power requirements, and weight growth.  
Also discussed are the LTS-101 engine, engine alternatives, recent events, political 
issues, and the future of the HH-65 powerplant as it relates to this study. 
 
History of the Coast Guard HH-65 
 
The HH-65 Dolphin Helicopter is the Coast Guard’s twin-engine, Short-Range 
Rescue (SRR) helicopter. Developed as the replacement for the single-engine HH-52A 
Pelican, it was manufactured by Aerospatiale Helicopter Corporation (AHC) – now 
known as American Eurocopter (Mason, 2002:1).  The Coast Guard awarded AHC the 
contract for production in 1979.  The HH-65A (366G) is a modified version of AHC’s 
commercially-made (365N1) Dauphin Helicopter (Schlatter, 1997:3; Couch, 2003c).  Of 
the approximately 200 aircraft operated by the Coast Guard, the HH-65 accounts for 
almost half of the Coast Guard’s aircraft inventory as well as approximately half of the 
Coast Guard’s total annual helicopter hours (Connor, Devoe et al., 1998:7; "Honeywell 
Develops Improved Controls," 2002).  The Coast Guard took delivery of the first HH-
65A in 1984 and received a total of 96 helicopters by 1989 (Schlatter, 1997:1).  The 
current inventory includes 95 – the Coast Guard purchased two used airframes after three 
HH-65 Helicopters were lost in separate crashes (Couch, 2003).  
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Mission Requirements 
The Coast Guard developed the HH-65A mission requirements based on Title 14 
USC 2.  This law mandates the Coast Guard with responsibility for Search and Rescue 
(SAR) on the high seas and navigable waters of the U.S.  This jurisdiction extends to 150 
miles offshore.  “Over 98% percent of all SAR cases occur within this zone, for which 
the SRR helicopter provides the primary response capability” (Schlatter, 1997:1).  In 
order to meet these requirements, modifications to the commercial version of the 
Dolphin, the (365N1) Dauphin, had to be made (Couch, 2003c).  The modifications 
included the following: 
• Larger and modified tail section 
• Increased seat structure for better crash worthiness 
• Second Loran rack 
• Freon Air Conditioning system  
• Modification of original engine to allow for cold-weather (polar)  
operations 
 
• Electromagnetic Interference Protection 
• Filter on Radar Altimeter 
In total, these modifications resulted in an aircraft that was significantly heavier than the 
commercial model.  These modifications marked the beginning of the history of the HH-
65’s weight growth and were a factor in drastically reducing the delivered aircraft’s 
reserve power and mission capability.   
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Power Required vs. Power Available 
 Weight growth in any aircraft is an important issue.  In a small aircraft, like the 
HH-65, it can be crucial in the eventual performance and safety of the aircraft.  Weight 
added to the airframe results in a decrease in the power available and that results in a 
decrease in power reserve.  Power reserve is the difference between power available and 
power required.  Power required is dependent on the type of maneuver performed, such 
as take-off or hovering.  Power available depends on many factors including air 
temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, density altitude, and aircraft weight.  The 
greater the power reserve, the greater the capability of an aircraft to perform high-power 
operations.  For the HH-65, high-power operations include takeoff, hovering (to include 
hoisting), and landing to a confined area.  These high-power operations are standard 
operations for the HH-65 in the normal course of its mission profile (HH-65 Flight 
Manual, 1996:5-15, A-19) . 
As the power reserve decreases, high-power-required maneuvers become more 
demanding.  Factors such as increased aircraft weight, hotter air temperature, higher 
humidity, and higher altitude are variables that decrease the power available to an 
aircraft.  Any factor that decreases power available must result in a corresponding 
decrease in the takeoff fuel load to stay beneath the allowable gross weight and/or engine 
limitations.  Each decrease in fuel corresponds to a decrease in maximum range and 
endurance.  In the case of added weight, an increase in airframe weight requires a 
corresponding trade-off in the allowable amount of maximum fuel at take-off in order to 
stay under the maximum allowable gross weight.  (Six-hundred pounds of fuel roughly 
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equates to sixty minutes of flight time in the HH-65.)  A reduction in fuel results in a 
parallel reduction in the maximum range the helicopter can fly (Schlatter, 1997:9). 
 
Weight Growth 
 Upon initial delivery in 1984, the HH-65A met the mission requirements 
previously discussed with a crew of three to include a pilot, copilot, and flight mechanic.  
Modifications made to meet these requirements accounted for a 605 lb. weight increase 
over the original 366G Dauphin (Schlatter, 1997:3).  In all, the modifications resulted in a 
launch weight of 8895 lbs., which was only five pounds under the maximum allowable 
gross weight at the time.  The initial delivered model could hold a maximum of 1866 lbs. 
of fuel on takeoff and had only an 8% power reserve due to the increase in weight 
(Schlatter, 1997:8).  Figure 1 outlines the timeline of the various HH-65 upgrades and 
changes since becoming operational. 
 
 
Figure 1.  HH-65 Timeline 1984 – 2003 
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range.  Most modifications were official in nature and documented by Coast Guard 
leadership.   
 
Table 1.  HH-65 Weight Growth History (Schlatter, 1997:3, 8-13) 
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1979 original 366G  5592 8400      150 
1984 delivered HH-65A 607.90 6200 8900 842 8900 8.3 1858 2.8 150 
1988 
x-bond 
transponder 5.50 6205 8900 842 8900 8.3 1853 2.8 149 
1988 Rescue Swimmer 0.00 6205 8900 1042 8900 6.5 1653 2.4 127 
1990 Secure voice 4.00 6209 8900 1042 8900 6.5 1649 2.4 126 
1991 TALON 46.00 6255 8900 1042 8900  1603 2.3 121 
1994 
Reinforced 
Engine support 5.00 6260 8900 1042 8900  1598 2.3 121 
1994 Integrated GPS 12.80 6273 8900 1042 8900  1585 2.3 119 
1994 Undocumented 80.00 6353 8900 1042 8900  1505 2.2 110 
1994 MGB upgrade 0.00 6353 9200 1042 9017 5.2 1622 2.4 123 
1992 
NVG cockpit 
upgrade 3.00 6356 9200 1042 9018.2 5.2 1620 2.4 123 
1996 Kapton wiring 10.00 6366 9200 1042 9008.2 5.2 1600 2.3 121 
1996 TCAS 30.30 6397 9200 1042 9038.5 5.2 1600 2.3 121 
1998 CVFDR 4.50 6401 9200 1042 9043 5.2 1600 2.3 121 
1998 Standby Att Ind 10.00 6411 9200 1042 9053 5.2 1600 2.3 121 
2000 
Avionics Upgrade 
(HH-65B only) (90.00) 6321 9200 1042 8963 5.2 1600 2.3 121 
 
 
Additional unofficial and undocumented modifications, such as structural repairs, 
water/oil entrapment inside honeycomb structures, repeated paint applications and over 
400 change orders of weight additions less than five pounds, were made as a result of 
unrelated maintenance issues or due to environmental factors (Schlatter, 1997:8-10).  
Note that although the maximum allowable weight remained at 8900 lbs. until 1994, the 
basic weight of the aircraft steadily increased and the power reserve has never exceeded 
10 percent.   
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The HH-65 Flight Manual states the following in reference to the importance of power 
reserve: 
Warning:  When the maximum power available is not a minimum of 10 percent 
greater than that required to hover at 50 feet, the maneuver becomes very 
demanding and should not be attempted unless mission urgency dictates.  (HH-65 
Flight Manual, 1996:2-22) 
 
As shown in the far right column of Table 1, this increase in weight resulted in a 
corresponding decrease in the maximum range until 1994.  Since then, more increases to 
the basic weight have made for a steady decrease in the maximum range up to the 
present. 
In contrast to the negative aspects associated with weight growth, positive 
modifications in terms of power available and allowable gross weight included a 1994 
Main Gearbox (MGB) upgrade that significantly increased torque limits and power 
limitations based on the transmission system.  This modification increased the maximum 
allowable gross weight to 9200 lbs. for restricted operations (HH-65 Flight Manual, 
1996:5-15; Schlatter, 1997:9). 
Subsequent developments since 1994 have accounted for a net weight increase of 
approximately 50 lbs. on the HH-65A (Schlatter, 1997:11).  However, the HH-65 Bravo 
model upgrade accounts for a 90 lb. decrease in the helicopter’s basic weight.  Currently, 
there are 47 Bravo models in operational use (Couch, 2003e). 
Even with this improvement, however, the fact that the HH-65 takes off at or near 
its gross weight for every mission means that HH-65 crews continue to perform 
demanding missions with a very thin power margin (HH-65 Flight Manual, 1996:5-15, 
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A-19).  This severely restricts the HH-65’s ability to recover multiple survivors or effect 
rescues more than 100 miles offshore.   
 
The LTS 101-750-B2 Power Plant 
 
The HH-65 is powered by two LTS-101-750-B2 engines which produce 735 shaft 
horse power (SHP) each for single-engine operations and 680 SHP each for dual engine 
operations (Schlatter, 1997:5).  The Buy American act requires the Department of 
Defense and the Coast Guard to purchase products “substantially all from articles, 
materials, or supplies mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States.”  An end 
product is considered in compliance with this law if greater than 50% of all its 
components are purchased from domestic sources.  As applied to the HH-65, Buy 
American required that 50% of the aircraft’s value come from U. S. sources (Buy 
American Act, 1954).  With the engines as the logical candidate (Couch, 2003c), AHC 
subcontracted Textron-Lycoming (TLC) for development of the LTS-101 which was 
developed for the Coast Guard HH-65 (Ballew vs. US DoJ, 1999:4.3).  This engine 
experienced several problems during the early years of the HH-65 (Tung, Jacobs et al., 
1989:xiii-xiv). 
The cost of maintaining the LTS-101 was very high during the first few years of 
service due to several factors.  Originally designed to allow repair at the unit level, the 
Coast Guard found this impossible and was forced to perform engine overhauls at their 
Aircraft Repair and Supply Center (AR&SC) in North Carolina (Hughes, 1989:20).  Not 
only were these overhauls more expensive than originally planned for, but they were also 
required more frequently. 
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According to the original contract with TLC, the expected mean time between 
overhauls of the LTS-101 was to be 2400 hours.  However, from July 1988 through 
August 1989, this figure was actually around 400 hours.  Similarly, a 600-hour engine 
removal inspection developed for initial quality assurance was modified to a 60-hour 
inspection to insure engine integrity (Tung, Jacobs et al., 1989:11).  This increase in 
required maintenance in combination with premature critical engine part failures and lack 
of spare parts allowed for an HH-65 availability of only 60% during the first six years of 
service (Hughes, 1989:19; Schlatter, 1997:7).  Availability is a measure of the percentage 
of time an asset is available to perform its mission (Couch, 2003d).  As compared to the 
Coast Guard’s stated availability goal of 71% for the HH-65, this initial availability was 
quite low and had a direct impact on operational effectiveness.  
An incident off the Oregon coast in 1989 provided an example of the 
consequences of the lack of availability.  When two crewmembers bailed out of their 
National Guard F-4, the Coast Guard dispatched a helicopter from Air Station Astoria.  
Only two of the three helicopters at this unit were available for launch (the third was 
down due to maintenance).  The first helicopter dispatched was forced to abort due to a 
mechanical failure and although a second helicopter eventually reached the scene, only 
one of the crewmen survived and was successfully rescued (Hughes, 1989:19).  While 
not directly related to the LTS-101, this incident prompted an investigation by the State 
Representative from Oregon, Representative Denny Smith (R-Ore).  Upon investigation, 
Representative Smith discovered the many problems associated with the HH-65 at the 
time and recommended to the Commandant at the time, Admiral Paul Yost, that the Coast 
Guard consider replacing the engine (Hughes, 1989:20).   
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Another incident that was directly attributable to the LTS-101 was a forced 
ditching of an HH-65 off Puerto Rico in January of 1989 due to a power turbine wheel 
fracture (Hughes, 1989:19).  Including the Puerto Rico mishap, there were five such 
incidents between 1987 and 1989.  As a result, the Coast Guard temporarily reduced the 
maximum cruise operating temperature from 749° C to 700° C and the allowable gross 
weight from 8700 lbs. to 8200 lbs.  In response to the problems with the power turbine 
wheel, Lycoming performed a special inspection on all the LTS-101 in the Coast Guard 
inventory at the time and replaced any power turbine wheels with over 300 hours of flight 
time.   
The power turbine wheel failures began in 1984, but the cause was not determined 
until 1988 (Kandebo, 1990a:28).  It was found that the blade cracks were caused by the 
blade and disk portion heating and cooling at differing rates.  An FAA Airworthiness 
directive issued in 1987 required a dye inspection every 50 hours for early detection of 
these cracks.  The failure in late 1989 prompted the Coast Guard to reduce this interval to 
30 hours (Kandebo, 1990a:29).  In spite of increased inspections, some cracks went 
undetected due to incorrect inspection procedures and poorly designed inspection 
equipment.  In response, the Coast Guard redesigned the inspection equipment and 
limited the number of personnel involved in performing the inspections (Kandebo, 
1990a:29).  Eventually, Lycoming changed the design of the power turbine wheel blade 
that reduced the heat-induced stress of the original design.  The new blades delivered in 
December of 1989 increased reliability of the LTS-101 and reduced the required 
maintenance man-hours (Tung, Jacobs et al., 1989:22; Kandebo, 1990b:24-25).  The 
Coast Guard lifted the temporary restrictions after TLC replaced the flawed power 
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turbine wheels in 1991.  Unfortunately, with the resolution of one problem, another 
surfaced.  
A second problem with the engine surfaced in 1994.  The power turbine wheel 
became unbalanced due to movement of the blades.  The turbine blades attached to the 
hub by a countersunk rivet.  This allowed for small movement of the blades, which 
unbalanced the wheel.  Allied-Signal, which acquired Textron Lycoming in 1994, took 
responsibility for fixing this problem.  A new solid-bore rivet was designed to remove the 
chance of blade movement (Kandebo, 1996:70).    
As of 1996, the LTS-101 had an unscheduled removal rate of 1.5 per 1000 hours.   
Through several improvements, Allied-Signal sought to reduce this rate to 0.4.  In 
addition to the redesigned blade attachment, other improvements included a new ‘Plus 2’ 
powerplant which included an upgraded gas producer nozzle, rear support housing and 
number 2 and 3 bearings (Kandebo, 1996:22).  Other improvements included adding a 
low coke combustor and flexible fuel manifold because carbon build-up was causing 
blade corrosion.  The low coke combustor was designed to reduce oil coking that was 
occurring in the rear bearing support housing when the oil formed carbon at high 
temperatures (Tung, Jacobs et al., 1989:22).  The flexible fuel manifold replaced a rigid 
fuel manifold design to eliminate frequent required inspections (Kandebo, 1996:70). 
The LTS-101-750 engine is no longer in production.  Currently maintained by 
Honeywell International, Inc, the Coast Guard owns approximately 11% of the LTS-101-
750s in the world (Couch, 2003c).  After Allied Signal acquired Textron-Lycoming’s gas 
turbine business in 1994 (Kandebo, 1996:70), Honeywell merged with Allied Signal in 
1999 (Murray and Deogun, 2001).   
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LTS 101 Fuel Governing System 
 
The conventional pneumatic fuel control (also known as engine control) system in 
the HH-65 was developed specifically for the LTS-101 in order to meet Coast Guard 
requirements.  While this system did meet the requirements, it did so at considerable cost.  
Alternatives considered were an analog-electronic fuel governing system developed 
while the HH-65 was still in the developmental phase and a Full Authority Digital Engine 
Control (FADEC) system (Chisom, 1984:189). 
In 1982, Lucas Aerospace developed a FADEC system for the HH-65.  While test 
flights of this system were successful in demonstrating the feasibility of the Lucas 
FADEC for the HH-65, there were problems associated with a lack of redundancy of the 
Engine Control Computer software and lack of cockpit compatibility.  Since the expected 
benefits of the FADEC were small in relation to the cost of further development, it was 
not installed on the HH-65 (Chisom, 1984:189-192).  Instead of FADEC, the Coast 
Guard opted for a custom-made engine control system. 
Lawsuit leads to Engine Improvements 
 
A major turning point in the mission effectiveness of the HH-65 came in 1990, 
when the Coast Guard won a lawsuit against TLC.  In 1987, Lycoming predicted that 
problems with the LTS-101 would take two years to resolve.  By 1989, however, there 
had been little improvement in the situation.  In 1989, due to allegations of defective 
parts installed on the LTS-101, Lycoming became the subject of investigations by the 
Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office.  Concurrently, the Coast Guard 
began the process of seeking compensation from TLC, but put the investigation on hold 
pending the Department of Justice action (Hughes, 1989:19).  
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A two-year investigation revealed that the engines were operating at excessive 
temperatures and as a result were deteriorating faster than expected.  This resulted in 
numerous engine problems such as the previously discussed turbine-wheel cracking 
(Kandebo, 1990b:24-25).  The Coast Guard also discovered from a whistleblower that 
when TLC made modifications to allow the engines to fly in snow, it charged the Coast 
Guard for unrelated modifications in order to eliminate other defects.  Although TLC 
admitted no wrongdoing, they were required to pay the Coast Guard $17.9 million 
(Kandebo, 1990b).   
Additionally, as part of the settlement, TLC was required to institute an LTS-101 
improvement program and take responsibility for the potential $60 million cost of future 
unscheduled engine maintenance and supply of replacement parts for six years.  This 
Power-By-The-Hour arrangement required the Coast Guard to pay a fee based on the 
number of engine hours flown.  This greatly increased TLC’s share of the costs in engine 
replacement and overhaul and subsequently increased the company’s incentive to make 
necessary improvements to the engines (Kandebo, 1990a:24-25).  This contract has been 
in effect continuously since 1990 and was most recently extended to 2006 (Kandebo, 
1990a; "Power by the Hour Agreement," 2002).   
 
Engine Alternatives 
Although the LTS-101 was designed with the same life expectancy as the 
airframe (20 years), the Coast Guard considered replacing the engine early due to the 
aforementioned reliability problems as well as its lack of weight growth potential 
(Hughes, 1989:19).  A 1989 report by the Department of Transportation examined the 
 
18 
Light Helicopter Turbine Engine Company (LHTEC) T800 and the Turbomeca Arriel 1C 
as viable alternatives to the LTS-101 (Tung, Jacobs et al., 1989:xii).   
While the Army’s more-powerful T800 was the primary focus of the study, the 
researchers also studied six other engines.  Each engine was either heavier than the LTS-
101 or less fuel-efficient than the T800.  While the T800 was considered a low technical 
risk in terms of its performance and reliability, it would have required costly and 
extensive re-engineering to modify the HH-65 (Tung, Jacobs et al., 1989:38).  The T800 
did offer lower operating and support costs due to the ability to share costs with the 
Army.  This was projected to reduce the operating costs from $175 per hour (LTS-101) to 
$70 per hour (T800).  Additionally, the T800 would have provided the HH-65 with an 
additional 550 SHP per engine giving it enough power to hover on one engine in the 
event of a single-engine power loss.  The disadvantage of the T800 was the requirement 
for a reduction gear box retrofit and the fact the engine was not fully developed at the 
time of consideration (Hughes, 1989:20).   
The second engine considered was the Arriel 1C.  The Arriel had the advantage of 
being a quick fix since there were 2000 engines in use with the SA 365 (the commercial 
version of the HH-65).  The Arriel would not have provided as much power as the T800 
but was considered more reliable due to its proven performance record (Hughes, 
1989:20).  However, the Arriel had to overcome prejudices that were and are still 
common within the government today; then-Commandant Yost, vowed to never again 
“buy a helicopter or an airplane that was not a DOD-supported piece of equipment” 
(Kandebo, 1990b:25).   
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In the final analysis, the authors of the DOT study recommended that the Coast 
Guard continue with and closely monitor the LTS-101 engine improvement program that 
was in progress at that time.  Additionally they recommended that the proof of concept of 
the T800 be completed and an examination be made into the airframe modifications that 
would be required for the T800 (Tung, Jacobs et al., 1989:xviii).  As such, a contract was 
awarded to Allison/Garrett in 1989 to conduct a 50-hour proof-of-concept of the Light 
Helicopter Turbine Engine Company (LHTEC) T800 (Kolcum, 1989:38).  In 1991, an 
HH-65 outfitted with the LHTEC T800 engines flew “flawlessly” during a 56-minute test 
flight ("T800 Milestones," 1991).  No further test flights were completed, however, as the 
Coast Guard ended plans in 1991 to replace the LTS-101 after TLC made significant 
improvements to the engine following the lawsuit settlement ("CG Drops Reengining," 
1990).   
 
Recent Events 
There has been a recent increase in engine failures and overall engine reliability in 
the HH-65 since 1997 (COGARD MAY 14, 2003).  As illustrated in Figure 2, 
availability has decreased while dispatch failure due to engine malfunctions has increased 
in the last five years (COGARD MAR 27, 2003).  A successful dispatch occurs when an 
aircraft meets its scheduled takeoff time and accomplishes its scheduled mission.  
Dispatch failure is the ratio of successful dispatches to delayed and aborted dispatches.  A 
failed dispatch can be a result of maintenance, weather, pilot availability, and other 
factors (Couch, 2003d).  In the context of this discussion, only those cancellations or 
aborts due to engine-related malfunctions are included. 
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Experts have attributed this increase in dispatch failure to a failing engine 
component.  Honeywell Corporation produces and overhauls the Power Turbine 
Governor (PTG) in Greer, South Carolina.  After the increase in PTG failures, the Coast 
Guard discovered that Honeywell had subcontracted production and overhaul of the PTG 
to a subcontractor (Couch, 2003b). 
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Figure 2.  Annual HH65 Reliability vs. Dispatch Rate (COGARD MAR 27, 2003) 
 
 
 
Faulty Power Turbine Governor 
 
Coast Guard experts suspect that the PTG contains a faulty bearing that changes 
the output signal of the governor.  The aircraft’s anticipator system is able to mask this 
faulty signal up to a certain point.  However, once the signal gets too far out of range, the 
anticipator can no longer compensate and a difference in torques between the engines 
becomes apparent.  This is commonly referred to as a Torque Split (HH-65 Flight 
Manual, 1996:3-16-3-17; Serrano, 2003).  Up until April of 2003, there was no procedure 
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to rule out the PTG as the root cause of a Torque Split.  As a result, many maintenance 
teams were replacing other related components once the problem manifested itself.  
Unfortunately, this did not remedy the problem and led to serious engine malfunctions 
later on (Serrano, 2003).  Because of these developments, the Coast Guard and 
Honeywell initiated a recall of all faulty PTGs in the inventory.  It is expected to take 
several months to replace all the faulty PTGs in the Coast Guard and civil fleet (Couch, 
2003b; f; Serrano, 2003).  
HH-65 Operations Restricted 
 
Due to the recent increase in power loss incidents, including two involving 
deployed helicopters that were forced to land on a ship with only one engine operative, 
the Coast Guard Chief of Operations has issued special guidance and restrictions on HH-
65 operations aimed at reducing extended hover operations (COGARD Oct 03, 2003; CG 
PACAREA Oct 30, 2003).  This includes limiting landings to confined areas such as 
hospital pads and reducing the weight of the aircraft by removal of gear and/or personnel 
not operationally critical.  These restrictions include limiting the use of two of an extra 
rescue swimmer for routine training, marine safety observers, cameras, and portable hoist 
recording equipment.  This guidance also restricts the HH-65 takeoff weight from a ship 
to a weight that allows an absolute altitude loss of fifty feet in case of single engine 
failure.  This restriction severely restricts the amount of fuel a helicopter can take off with 
and thus reduces the endurance of the helicopter to approximately one hour per sortie.  
These restrictions reduce mission effectiveness by decreasing the length of training 
flights, delaying launch in order to defuel, decreasing the ability of an already airborne 
helicopter to divert due to low fuel or lack of rescue swimmer, and restricting landings in 
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confined areas for patient pick up or delivery (COGARD Oct 03, 2003; CG LANTAREA 
Oct 16, 2003). 
As the reliability of the HH-65 declines, one of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater 
initiatives seeks to upgrade the aircraft.  Deepwater is the Coast Guard’s long-term 
recapitalization of aging assets, including aircraft.  The Coast Guard plans to keep the 
HH-65 in service through various avionics and engine upgrades.  The avionics upgrades 
have already begun with the HH-65B.  More powerful engines are required, not only to 
catch up with weight increases already made, but also to allow the aircraft to evolve with 
the increased mission requirements of Homeland Security (Padfield, 2003).  However, 
“arming the helo and vertical insertion is currently not possible due to inadequate power” 
(CG PACAREA Oct 30, 2003). 
Improvements 
 
In fiscal year 1999, in order to improve overall engine performance, the Coast 
Guard agreed to purchase nine prototype Lead-the-Fleet (LTF) engines as a proof of 
concept.  These engines experienced a high number of chip events (metal particles in the 
engine oil) due to faulty rework of the existing gearboxes.  Although the LTF engines 
proved less than promising, some of the individual components were found to offer 
significant improvements.  To take advantage of these components, the Coast Guard 
established the Component Technology Insertion Program (CTIP) in 2000.  The first 
component purchased under this program was the Rear Bearing Support Housing 
(RBSH).  It offered many improvements including a reduction in oil coking which 
damages the engine, and improvements in engine oil lubrication and cooling.  After 
Honeywell ceased production of the RBSH, the Coast Guard’s initial order of 25 RBSH’s 
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was reduced to ten and the Coast Guard used the leftover funds to purchase new effusion 
liners.  The new liners eliminate carbon build-up on the engine gas producer and power 
turbine blades.  This, in turn, increases engine longevity and improves the power margin.  
The CTIP engines provide more power and run cooler.  This is especially critical to the 
many air stations located in tropical climates.  In all, the Coast Guard spent $765K on 18 
LTF engines and $4.5M on 104 CTIP engines (Dyer, 2003). 
In addition to the LTF and CTIP engines, the Coast Guard and Honeywell 
implemented the Incremental Power Increase Engine (IPI) (COGARD MAY 14, 2003).  
This engine projects an 8% increase in power (Dyer, 2003).  Distribution to hot-climate 
units began in early September 2003 (COGARD MAY 14, 2003; Dyer, 2003).  Part of 
this comes from a new Gas Producer Turbine for the LTS-101-850.  Yet in spite of 
promised improvements, problems persist.   
Two 850 engines seized after shutdown after being installed on overhauled 
helicopters at the Coast Guard’s Aircraft Repair and Supply Center.  Because of this, two 
helicopters with the new engines at Air Station Miami were grounded (CG AR&SC Nov 
14, 2003).  Upon investigation, the Coast Guard discovered that Honeywell had increased 
the turbine blade length in order to produce more power.  However, when the engine 
temperature increased, the blades expanded and fused themselves to the wall of the 
engine (Couch, 2003a) 
Honeywell’s closest competitor in the battle to re-engine the HH-65 is the 
Turbomeca Arriel 2C2.  The first successful test flight of an HH-65 powered by the 
Turbomeca Arriel 2C1 engines took place in October of 2002.  An Arriel 2C2 was tested 
as part of Phase II of the HH-65 Engine Power Project (Couch, 2003c).  Certified in July 
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2002, the latest version of the Arriel, the 2C2, provides 1054 SHP per engine.  Since the 
Arriel is common to the EC-155 commercial helicopter, it would likely reduce overall 
operating costs for the HH-65 while offering significant increases in power and range 
("First Flight," 2002; Harvey, 2002).   
Honeywell’s long-term solution is the HTS-900, an advanced growth version of 
the current LTS-101 (Couch, 2003c).  The FAA expects to certify this engine in mid-
2006 at the earliest  The new compressor, which is expected to take 24 months to fully 
develop, will include a cooled turbine and an improved airflow modulator that is 
expected to increase existing engine reliability fourfold (Wagstaff, 2003).  The 900 will 
also include a 2 stage PT wheel which will likely require the addition of a reduction 
gearbox (Couch, 2003c).  Built in modules, the 900 allows for upgrade of existing 
versions of the LTS-101 (Wagstaff, 2003). 
 
The Future 
 
The HH-65 average fleet age is almost 20 years old and most aircraft have 
accumulated well over 5000 hours.  The HH-65 operates in harsh environmental 
conditions that include low-level flight over salt water and ship-based operations.  The 
age of the aircraft and a harsh operating environment combined with the Coast Guard’s 
traditionally austere budget has made the maintenance and upgrade of this valuable 
resource a continuing challenge.  The HH-65 is now scheduled to remain in service until 
2015 (Connor, Devoe et al., 1998:8).   
 
 
25 
Chapter Review 
This chapter discussed the background and history of the HH-65 as well as the 
development of its engine, the LTS-101.  While specific literature related to the Coast 
Guard HH-65 or the LTS-101-750 was limited, this chapter provides a comprehensive 
examination of what is available both publicly and corporately (within the Coast Guard).  
Specifically, we focused on the early reliability issues, evolution of the LTS-101-750, the 
lack of power reserve, and its negative impact on the mission effectiveness of the HH-65.  
Finally, we highlighted recent improvements to the HH-65 powerplant, the current 
operational restrictions, and projections for the future of this critical asset. 
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 III.  Methodology 
 
 
This chapter describes the research methods used and the analysis performed in 
our study of the engine reliability of the HH-65.  In general, this study involves an 
exploratory analysis of recent engine malfunctions and engine-related mishaps of the 
HH-65 helicopter.  We focus on answering research questions one through three as 
outlined in Chapter One.   
 
Engine Mishap Data 
 
The Coast Guard’s Aviation Safety office provided the engine mishap data for 
127 mishaps.  We receive the raw data in text form.  It consists of summarized mishap 
messages from 1997 through May of 2003.  We examine only those aviation mishaps 
related to the LTS-101 engine and/or its components in our analysis.  After review, we 
consolidate this data into spreadsheet format, which includes the following categories: 
• Mishap number as assigned by the Coast Guard Safety Office 
• Date of mishap – day, month, year 
• Year  - to allow for examination by year 
• Aircraft tail number 
• Cost of mishap – accounts for component repair, replacement and man 
hours 
• Phase of flight – takeoff, landing, level flight, etc 
• Mission – such as Search and Rescue (SAR) or Law Enforcement (LE) 
• Action – applies to action taken to the engine – replacement or inspection 
• Faulty Component – the component or components replaced as a result of 
the mishap 
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• Multi-component – a binary response category where we indicate that 
only zero or one component was replaced with a ‘0’ and more than one 
component was replaced with a ‘1’ 
• Comments  
• Ship Operations – a binary response category accounting for mishaps that 
occurred during operations with a Coast Guard Cutter or Navy Ship 
 
We count those mishaps that resulted in more than one replaced or faulty 
component as many times as necessary to account for all suspected components.  This 
ensures a complete analysis of all components.  In addition, we code these mishaps with a 
‘1’ in the multi-component column to ensure that we do not count these mishaps more 
than once for any other analysis.  Once in spreadsheet form, we examine this data using 
Excel (Microsoft Excel, 2002).  
Limits of Safety Data 
 
The safety data is comprised of a synopsis of mishap messages.  Due to latitude in 
the reporting requirements, this data may not include all engine-related mishaps that 
occurred during the period of study.  Unit safety officers write mishap messages.  While 
these officers attend formal Aviation Safety Officer Training, there is still an element of 
investigative technique involved in determining the cause of mishaps.  Also, in the case 
of a component such as the Power Turbine Governor (PTG), which was not known to be 
faulty until recently, there may have been past mishaps caused by this component that 
were not discovered until recently.   
 
Component Replacement History Data 
 
We obtained component replacement history data from the Coast Guard’s 
Aviation Computerized Maintenance System.  The raw data is in the form of ten Excel 
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spreadsheets covering the replacement history of ten different components as listed 
below:  (Appendix A: Definition of Terms contains descriptions of each component) 
• Airflow Modulator 
• Anticipator Actuator 
• Anticipator Control Box 
• Engine (Accessory Reduction Gearbox) 
• Fuel Control 
• Fuel Pump 
• Overspeed Limiter 
• Power Turbine Governor 
• Temperature Compensator 
• Torque Transducer 
This data includes 13,565 component replacements during the period of study.  
We examine this data to determine trends over time and possible correlations between 
types of malfunctions and components causing the malfunctions.  In the case of 
component replacement data, we generally treat the type of malfunction as the response 
variable, while the replaced component acts as the explanatory variable.   
Building the Database 
 
Before analysis, we inspect the data for errors and inconsistencies.  In addition, 
we consolidate the ten individual spreadsheets to allow for easier analysis.  We also use 
the comments provided by the maintainers to categorize each trouble removal into a 
particular malfunction.  For example, we grouped the comments, ‘removed for torque 
splits’ ‘torque split’s, and ‘unable to match torques’ as torque splits.   
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This consolidated spreadsheet includes the following categories (columns):  
(See Appendix B: Data Categories for a complete listing) 
• Component serial number 
• Component name – includes ten different components 
• Reason for removal – trouble, time, other, or cannibalization 
• Date of removal 
• Time Since New (TSN) in hours – indicates how many hours the component has 
operated since new 
• Time Since Overhaul (TSO) in hours – indicates the number of hours the 
component has operated since its last overhaul 
• Associated engine or airframe number – some components are considered part of 
the engine while others are considered airframe components. 
• Activity – the unit responsible for the removal 
• Malfunction – specific reason for component removal as determined and 
categorized from comments 
• Cross Component – a binary response where ‘0’ indicates that the malfunction is 
related to only one component.  A ‘1’ indicates that more than one component 
was replaced in response to this malfunction type. 
• Comments – raw comments as written by the maintainers or pilot 
 
Limits of the Component Replacement Data 
 
We analyze removed components in relation to the written symptom or 
malfunction as specified by the pilot or maintainer.  These descriptions are subjective in 
nature.  Many are very detailed, while others are cryptic.  To quantify the data, we group 
these descriptions into categories of malfunctions.  In many cases, interpretation of what 
the original writer of the symptom meant is necessary in order to fit each trouble removal 
into a malfunction category.  See  Appendix C: Torque Splits - Classified by Comments 
for a coding example.  Additionally we assume these comments are accurate.  In some 
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cases, comments indicating the possible malfunction may be incorrect, however, this 
error may be unknown until after a repair is completed and the same or similar 
malfunction occurs again on the same aircraft.  In addition, due to the complexity and 
interaction of the fuel governing and anticipator systems, it is often difficult to pinpoint 
the exact cause of the malfunction to one specific component.  As a result, the 
maintainers sometimes replace more than one component at the same time.  In these 
cases, it is impossible to know which component was truly at fault (Couch, 2003b).   
Many variables, other than what we examine in this study, affect engine 
reliability.  Some confounding variables are the location of the air station, the experience 
of the maintainers at a given location, the number of helicopters at a given station, and 
the average number of deployment days at a given unit.  For example an Air Station 
located in a heavy salt-water environment will likely experience more corrosion than one 
located near the Great Lakes.  In this type of situation, we would only see the decline in 
reliability, not necessarily the real reason behind it. 
 
Contingency Table Analysis 
 
Much of our analysis involves examining the association between different types 
of categories.  For example, malfunction to component or mishap to component.  In order 
to analyze associations between categorical data, it is necessary to use contingency table 
analysis.  Contingency table analysis provides an instrument for analyzing possible 
relationships between nominal data with more than two outcomes.  Since the data of this 
study consists of several categorical variables, this method of analysis proves highly 
useful.   
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In the case of contingency table analysis, the null hypothesis assumes that the two 
classifications are independent.  We test for independence by comparing the actual cell 
count to the expected cell count.  We use the chi-squared (χ2) test statistic, 
where
2
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−
= ∑ , and i is the number of cells.  Large values of χ2 indicate that the 
actual counts do not match the expected counts and the assumption of independence is 
likely false.  See McClave, 2001 for further details. 
We test the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level.  This means we accept a five percent 
chance that we conclude the variables are dependent when in fact they are independent.  
In order for contingency table analysis to be valid, the expected cell counts in each cell 
usually must be greater than five.  However, we accept the results as valid if no more 
than 20% of the cells of a given table have an expected cell count less than five.  We do 
not accept an expected cell count of less than 1.0 for any cell in a given table. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis in order to find 
correlations between continuous variables.  A regression model demonstrates a 
mathematical association between variables.  It attempts to predict behavior of a 
population based upon a sample of that population, or, as is the case with the data used in 
this study, to predict future outcomes based on past observations.  Regression alone 
cannot prove causation; it shows only correlations or relationships between variables.  
Other factors such as consistency, plausibility, and experimental evidence may 
demonstrate that an association is also causation (Simon, 2002). 
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In addition, the error or residuals of a regression model should satisfy several 
assumptions – constant variance, normality, independence, and identical distribution.  In 
working with observed data, however, these assumptions are rarely fully satisfied 
(Blasnick, 1995).  However, OLS is a robust measure against deviations from normality 
and constant variance (Neter, Kutner et al., 1996:106). 
 
Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression describes the relationship between a dichotomous outcome 
and an independent variable or variables.  Practically, OLS and logistic regression are 
very similar in that they both predict a dependent variable based on one or more 
independent variables (Dallal).  The main difference between linear and logistic 
regression is that linear regression predicts a particular value of the dependent variable 
while logistic regression predicts the probability or likelihood of a particular outcome.   
With logistic regression, the outcome of interest is dichotomous – yes or no, 
success or failure, on or off.  The outcome of logistic regression is expressed as a positive 
number between zero and one, which represents the probability of success.  For example, 
an outcome of 0.5 indicates that there is a 50% probability of a particular outcome 
occurring given specific values of the independent variable(s) (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
2000).   
The use of a linear model to determine a binary response would work in terms of 
the sign and significance levels of the coefficients; however, the predicted probabilities 
would be inaccurate.  This is due to two reasons.  First, the assumptions necessary for the 
error or residuals of a linear regression model (constant variance and normality) do not 
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hold true if the dependent variable is a binary response, and second, the predicted 
probabilities can be greater than one and less than zero.  The use of the logistic regression 
model solves these problems by transforming the linear regression model by taking the 
natural log of the ratio of the probability of an outcome occurring divided by the 
probability of it not occurring (Whitehead, 2001). 
While a graphical depiction of a linear regression model ranges from negative 
infinity to positive infinity, a logistic regression model ranges from zero to one.  Figure 3 
demonstrates this difference graphically.  The logistic model mirrors the cumulative 
probability function of a random variable.  The distribution is S-shaped which indicates 
the probability of the outcome increases slowly (with changes in the independent 
variable(s)) at first then increases rapidly before decreasing again as the probability 
approaches 1.0 or 100%. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Graphical Comparison of Linear and Logistic Regression Models (Whitehead, 2001) 
 
34 
Data Analysis 
In the following section, we analyze the data using the statistical methods outlined 
above.  Since both data sets are in the form of spreadsheets, we use Excel (Microsoft 
Excel, 2002) in order to provide descriptive statistics.  For in-depth analysis, we use 
JMP® Version 5.0.1.2 (JMP, 2003).  In all cases, alpha = 0.05 for the purposes of 
hypothesis testing. 
Research Question One 
 
The first research question asks, “Has the HH-65 become less reliable over time?”  
In order to answer this question we examine the number of trouble removals over time, 
the number of engine-related mishaps over time, and the relationship of the age of a 
component to the number of trouble removals. 
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Figure 4.  Total Trouble Removals by Year 
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Trouble Removals by Year 
 
We compile Figure 4 from component removal data.  This figure compares the 
total number of engine component trouble removals for the past six years.  We visually 
detect a general increasing trend and statistically confirm this trend of trouble removals 
using regression analysis.  In this case, we again measure time in years but we treat time 
as a continuous variable.  We use the linear regression model, Y = Bo + B1X + ε, where Y 
is the number of trouble removals and X is time in years.  We compute an adjusted R2 of 
0.90 and whole-model P-value of 0.0024 with B1 equaling 78.54.  Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis, Ho: B1 = zero, since this P-value is less than our alpha of 0.05.  We accept the 
alternate hypothesis, Ha: B1 ≠ 0.  In other words, trouble removals increase positively 
with time.   
The residuals of this regression model satisfy the assumptions of normality, 
constant variance, and independence.  There is one minor influential data point (Cook’s 
Distance greater than 0.25) and no major influential data points.  In this case, the 
influential data point is the year 2001.  Due to the small sample size (n = 6), this is not 
unusual nor a source of concern. 
Trouble removals by Individual Component and Year 
 
Next, we examine trouble removals by individual component and year.  We again 
use the removal history data for this analysis.  Figure 5 does not indicate a common trend 
over time among individual components.  Some components show a general increase in 
the number of removals (Airflow Modulator and Anticipator Actuator); others (Fuel 
Pump and Overspeed limiter) show a decrease in the number of removals over time.  
While we do not see a strictly increasing or decreasing relationship between year and the 
 
36 
number of trouble removals, there does appear to be a relationship between the type of 
component and the number of trouble removals.  Figure 6 depicts the total number of 
trouble removals by component.   
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Figure 5.  Number of Removal Counts for Trouble by Year and Component Excluding 2003 
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Figure 6.  Total Trouble Removals by Component 
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Although we discuss the issue of overhaul times later in this section, we note here 
that the Torque Transducer and the Anticipator Control Box do not undergo regular 
overhaul.  This means that they are kept in operation until failure.  It would be logical 
that these components would have higher numbers of trouble removals than those 
components that undergo a regular overhaul.  For this reason, we compare components 
by the total number of trouble and time removals.  We see that some components that 
have a lower number of trouble removals, such as the fuel pump, have a high number of 
total removals.  This is significant since whether a component is removed for trouble or 
time, there are still costs in terms of man-hours and aircraft availability.  Figure 7 shows 
the total of time and trouble removals by component. 
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Figure 7.  Time and Trouble Removals by Component 
 
 
Table 2 outlines the count of trouble removals by component.  We note that the 
five most frequently removed components account for over 70% of all component 
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removals during the period of this study.  We attribute the increasing trend of total 
trouble removals over time to these components. 
 
Table 2.  Summary of Trouble Removals by Component 
DESCRIPTION Grand Total Percentage Cumulative 
P tTORQUE TRANSDUCER 956 20% 20% 
ENGINE ACC/RED GEARBOX 683 14% 35% 
ANTICIPATOR CONTROL B 663 14% 49% 
AIRFLOW MODULATOR ACT 568 12% 60% 
POWER TURBINE GOVERNO 530 11% 72% 
FUEL CONTROL 439 9% 81% 
ANTICIPATOR ACTUATOR 391 8% 89% 
PUMP FUEL 306 6% 96% 
OVERSPEED LIMITER 108 2% 98% 
TEMPERATURE COMPENSAT 102 2% 100% 
TOTAL 4746 100% 100% 
 
 
 
Table 3 is a contingency table analysis of the number of trouble removals by 
component type.  The low P-value indicates that the number of trouble removals by 
component are not independent and that there is a strong correlation between type of 
component and the total number of trouble removals over the period of study. 
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Mishaps by Component and Year 
 
We now move to an analysis of mishap data.  Figure 8 compares the total number 
of mishaps by component for the last six years (through May 2003).  Since more than one 
component is at fault during many of these mishaps, the total number of mishaps through 
the same period is less than the sum of the numbers in Figure 8.   
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Figure 8.  Engine Related Mishaps by Faulty Component 
 
 
Figure 9 shows a comparison of mishaps by year.  There appears to be no trend in 
mishaps over time.  We note, however, that the percentage of mishaps caused by the 
Power Turbine Governor was disproportionately high during 2002 and the first five 
months of 2003.  The number of mishaps through May of 2003 exceeds the total for 
2003.  Half of these mishaps were caused by the PTG.  We attribute this to the known 
faulty power turbine governor, which was recalled and 80% replaced as of this writing. 
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Figure 9.  Number of Mishaps by Year 
 
 
Comparison of MTSN, Trouble Removals, and Number of Mishaps 
 
In order to determine whether age influences mishap rate, we analyze number of 
mishaps in relation to the age of the component.  Table 4 shows a comparison of 
component average age, the number of mishaps, number of trouble removals, and the 
total number of time and trouble removals by component during the period of study.   
 
 
Table 4.  Comparison of MTSN, Number of Mishaps, Number of Removals by Component 
Component MTSN MTSN/10 Number of Mishaps 
Number of 
Trouble 
Removals 
Total Removals 
(Trouble + Time 
ENGINE ACC/RED GEARBO# 4621.44 462.144 20 683 777 
FUEL CONTROL 3890.68 389.068 5 439 587 
TEMPERATURE COMPENSAT 3762.98 376.298 0 102 200 
AIRFLOW MODULATOR ACT 3692.53 369.253 9 568 653 
POWER TURBINE GOVERNO 3622.81 362.281 26 530 639 
OVERSPEED LIMITER 3589.49 358.949 2 108 355 
PUMP FUEL 3376.11 337.611 2 306 1024 
ANTICIPATOR CONTROL B* 1326.84 132.684 13 663 663 
ANTICIPATOR ACTUATOR 1268.98 126.898 7 391 713 
TORQUE TRANSDUCER* 616.54 61.654 9 956 956 
# Does not undergo normal overhaul * Does not undergo overhaul  
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In order to determine how age affects reliability, we visually examine the 
relationship of the average age of a component to the number of mishaps attributed to 
that component and to the number of trouble removals by component.  Figure 10 
demonstrates that there is no obvious association between the age of a component and the 
number of mishaps attributed to it. 
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Figure 10.  Comparison of Average TSN (in hundreds of hours) and Number of Mishaps by 
Component 
 
 
Figure 11 shows a similar situation.  There is no obvious relationship to the age of 
component and the number of trouble removals over the period of study.  While the 
Temperature Compensator is one of the older components, it has one of the lowest rates 
of trouble removals.  Conversely, the Torque Transducer is the newest component yet has 
the most number of trouble removals. 
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Figure 11.  Comparison of MTSN (in tens of hours) by Number of Trouble Removals by Component 
 
 
MTBF by MTSN 
 
Next, we examine the failure rate of each component in relation to its average age.  
We compare the average age of a component to the Mean Time Between Failures 
(MTBF).  We compute MTBF by taking the average time (in hours) using the Time Since 
New (TSN) between trouble replacements for each component from 1997 through May 
of 2003.   
 
Table 5.  Comparison of Mean Time Between Failures and Mean Time Since New by Component 
Component MTBF MTSN MTSN/10 Ratio of MTBF/MTSN 
TORQUE TRANSDUCER 278.72 616.54 61.654 0.45 
ANTICIPATOR ACTUATOR 558.48 1268.98 126.9 0.44 
ANTICIPATOR CONTROL B 335.21 1326.84 132.68 0.25 
OVERSPEED LIMITER 855.00 3589.49 358.95 0.24 
TEMPERATURE COMPENSAT 675.36 3762.98 376.3 0.18 
POWER TURBINE GOVERNO 509.64 3622.81 362.28 0.14 
AIRFLOW MODULATOR ACT 489.97 3692.53 369.25 0.13 
ENGINE ACC/RED GEARBO 586.46 4621.44 462.14 0.13 
FUEL CONTROL 451.77 3890.68 389.07 0.12 
PUMP FUEL 339.77 3376.11 337.61 0.10 
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Individual components with a sample size of one were not included in this computation 
since there was no previous data available to determine the TSN of the last failure.  Table 
5 shows the MTBF and MTSN for each component.  A higher MTBF is indicative a 
lower failure rate.  A high MTSN is indicative of an older component. 
Figure 12 is a graphical representation of the MTBF for each component.  A 
higher number indicates a lower failure rate.   
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Figure 12.  Average Time Between Trouble Removals by Component 
 
 
Figure 13 shows a comparison of MTBF and MTSN (in tens of hours) by 
component.  One might expect that older components would have a shorter MTBF.  
However, this is not the case.  The engine, which is the oldest component, has the third 
highest MTBF, while the Torque Transducer, the newest component, has the shortest 
MTBF.  There appears to be no relationship between MTBF and MTSN. 
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Figure 13.  Comparison of MTBF and MTSN by Component 
 
Figure 14 shows a graphical representation of the ratio of MTBF to MTSN for 
each component.  In this case, the higher the number indicates a higher the failure rate 
given the age of the component.  We listed components from worst to best in terms of 
performance in relation to age. 
 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
TO
RQ
UE
 T
RA
NS
DU
CE
AN
TI
CI
PA
TO
R 
AC
TU
AT
O
AN
TI
CI
PA
TO
R 
CO
NT
RO
L
OV
ER
SP
EE
D 
LI
MI
TE
TE
MP
ER
AT
UR
E 
CO
MP
EN
S
PO
W
ER
 TU
RB
IN
E 
GO
VE
R
AI
RF
LO
W
 M
OD
UL
AT
OR
 A
C
EN
GI
NE
 A
CC
/R
ED
 G
EA
RB
FU
EL
 C
ON
TR
OL
PU
MP
 F
UE
L
 
Figure 14.  Ratio of MTBF to MTSN by Component 
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Summary of Question One 
 
We find that while the overall number of trouble removals has increased over 
time, the number of removals by individual components has not increased with any 
regularity.  We attribute the increasing trend in the overall trouble removals to a few 
components.  With the exception of a higher rate of mishaps during the beginning of 
2003, the number of mishaps over time has not increased.  While there is no clear 
relationship between time and the number of trouble removals by component, there does 
appear to be a strong relationship between the type of component and the number of 
trouble removals.  There appears to be no relationship between the average age of a 
component and the number of trouble removals or the number of mishaps attributed to a 
component.  Table 6 shows the relative ranking of the components in terms of trouble 
removals, total of time and trouble removals, and Mean Time Between Failures.  A 
number one ranking indicates the worst reliability while a ten indicates the best. 
 
Table 6.  Component Reliability Ranking 
  
Rank of 
Trouble 
Rank for 
Total 
Rank of 
Mishaps
Rank of 
MTBF 
Average 
Rank
TEMPERATURE COMPENSATOR 10 10 10 9 9.75 
OVERSPEED LIMITER 9 9 8 10 9 
FUEL CONTROL 6 8 7 4 6.25 
ANTICIPATOR ACTUATOR 7 4 6 7 6 
PUMP FUEL 8 1 9 3 5.25 
AIRFLOW MODULATOR ACT 4 6 4 5 4.75 
POWER TURBINE GOVERNOR 5 7 1 6 4.75 
ENGINE ACC/RED GEARBOX# 2 3 2 8 3.75 
ANTICIPATOR CONTROL BOX# 3 5 3 2 3.25 
TORQUE TRANSDUCER# 1 2 5 1 2.25 
   #Does not undergo normal overhaul   
 
 
 
 
46 
We see that according to these measures, the Torque Transducer and the Anticipator 
Control Box are the least reliable components, while the Temperature Compensator and 
Overspeed Limiter are the most reliable. 
Research Question Two 
 
The second research question asks, “What primary factors are driving failures in 
the LTS 101 engine?”  We answer this by determining if there are any correlations 
between certain malfunctions and specific components or if there are any associations 
between certain malfunctions and specific systems.   
Trouble Removals by Component and Malfunction Type 
 
Figure 15 shows the percentage of components replaced for the fifteen most 
frequent malfunctions.  For example, this figure shows that a faulty torque transducer 
causes 100% of the Torque Indication Zero malfunction.   
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Figure 15.  Percentage of Component Replacement per Malfunction 
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We examine the same classifications statistically using contingency table analysis.  
We compute a χ2 statistic of 2800.1 and P-value of less than 0.0001.  This statistically 
confirms what we see in Figure 15; there is a strong correlation between the type of 
malfunction and faulty component.   
 
Table 7.  Summary of Most Frequent Malfunctions by Component 
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% 
18.25
% 
23.32
% 
23.32
% 
FAILED POWER 
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0.00% 0.00% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
100.0
0% 
3.08
% 
35.31
% 
BLUE GREASE 
WASHOUT 0.00% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
60.69
% 
2.07
% 
0.69
% 
36.55
% 
0.00
% 0.00% 
3.06
% 
38.37
% 
WOULD NOT 
OPEN 
100.0
0% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 0.00% 
3.01
% 
41.38
% 
ERRONEOUS 
TORQUE 
INDICATIONS 
0.00% 0.00% 
3.85
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
96.15
% 
2.74
% 
44.12
% 
TORQUE 
INDICATION 
ZERO 
0.00% 0.94% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
99.06
% 
2.23
% 
46.35
% 
COMPRESSOR 
STALLS 
55.88
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
29.41
% 
5.88
% 
0.00
% 
0.98
% 
0.98
% 
6.86
% 0.00% 
2.15
% 
48.50
% 
TORQUE 
INDICATION FULL 
SCALE 
0.00% 0.00% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
100.0
0% 
2.02
% 
50.53
% 
 
 
There are 425 distinct malfunctions described in the component removal data.  
See Appendix D: List and Count of Individual Malfunctions for a complete listing.  Of 
these, the ten most frequent malfunctions account for 50% of all malfunctions.  Table 7 
lists these malfunctions and the components associated with each.  We note that the 
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fourth and tenth most frequent malfunctions, Unable to Calibrate Transducer and Torque 
Indication Full Scale, are 100% attributable to the torque transducer.  This confirms our 
findings in question one since the Torque Transducer ranked last in overall reliability. 
Trouble Removals by System 
 
In order to determine if there is a relationship between system type and specific 
malfunctions, we categorize each component into its respective system and count the 
number of trouble removals (or faulty components) by system.  Table 8 shows the 
number of trouble removals by component and system.  We note that both the Bleed Air 
and Engine systems consist of only one component (in terms of this study).  The 
Anticipator system consists of three components, while the Fuel Governing system 
consists of five components. 
 
Table 8.  Components Categorized by System and Trouble Removals 
COMPONENT ANTICIPATOR BLEED AIR ENGINE 
FUEL 
GOVERNING 
TORQUE TRANSDUCER 956       
ENGINE ACC/RED GEARBO    683  
ANTICIPATOR CONTROL B 663    
AIRFLOW MODULATOR ACT   568   
POWER TURBINE GOVERNO     530 
FUEL CONTROL     439 
ANTICIPATOR ACTUATOR 391    
PUMP FUEL     306 
OVERSPEED LIMITER     108 
TEMPERATURE COMPENSAT     102 
 
 
 
Figure 16 depicts the number of trouble removals by system.  The Anticipator and 
Fuel Governing systems account for the majority of trouble removals.   
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Figure 16.  Number of Trouble Removals by System 
 
 
Table 9 summarizes the most frequent malfunctions by faulty system.  Anticipator 
and Fuel Governing components account for 1820 removals, which account for 75% of 
all removals among the ten most frequent malfunctions.   
 
Table 9.  Summary of Most Frequent Malfunction by System 
MALFUNCTION ANTICIPATOR FUEL GOVERNING 
BLEED 
AIR ENGINE Total 
TORQUE SPLITS 697 295 112 3 1107 
FAILED POWER ASSURANCE 12 33 7 212 264 
TORQUE OSCILLATIONS/FLUCTUATIONS 132 13 13 1 159 
UNABLE TO CALIBRATE TRANSDUCER 146    146 
BLUE GREASE WASHOUT  145   145 
WOULD NOT OPEN   143  143 
ERRONEOUS TORQUE INDICATIONS 130    130 
TORQUE INDICATION ZERO 106    106 
COMPRESSOR STALLS  15 57 30 102 
TORQUE INDICATION FULL SCALE 96    96 
 1319 501 332 246 2398 
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Next, we compare trouble removals by system and year to determine any trends 
over time.  Figure 17 and Table 10 show a breakdown of trouble removals by system and 
year.  We can see that the percentage of Anticipator System trouble removals has 
decreased over time while the percentage of Fuel Governing System Removals has 
increased. 
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Figure 17.  Comparison of Percentage of Trouble Removals by System by Year 
 
Table 10.  Trouble Removals by System 
DATE ANTICIPATOR BLEED AIR ENGINE 
FUEL 
GOVERNING 
Ratio of 
Anticipator 
to Fuel 
Governing 
Trouble 
Removals 
1997 245 46 75 143 1.713287 
1998 274 72 149 144 1.902778 
1999 289 81 97 175 1.651429 
2000 340 103 105 267 1.273408 
2001 349 82 87 268 1.302239 
2002 360 139 133 304 1.184211 
2003 153 45 37 184 0.831522 
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We confirm the relationship between year and ratio statistically using OLS 
regression and find a strong correlation (Adjusted R2 = 0.84) between Year and the Ratio 
of Anticipator System trouble removals to Fuel Governing System trouble removals.  We 
compute a P-value of 0.0023, and a B1 estimate of -0.158.  Since the P-value is less than 
0.05, we reject the null hypothesis that B1 = zero.  In this case, we find a negative 
correlation; as the year increases, the ratio decreases.  Our model satisfies the 
assumptions of normality, independence, and constant variance.  We find that the year 
1997 acts as a major influential data point and the years 1998 and 2003 act as minor 
influential data points.  Given the small sample size, this is not surprising and does not 
affect our overall conclusion.   
Summary of Question Two 
 
The type of component shows a strong correlation to the type of malfunction.  
Similarly, the type of system shows a strong correlation to the type of malfunction.  The 
ten most frequent malfunctions account for 50% of all distinct malfunctions counted.  
The most frequent malfunction, Torque Splits, was reported on 1107 occasions and 
accounts for 23% of all malfunctions.  The second most frequent malfunction, Failed 
Power Assurance, occurred 264 times.  The Anticipator System accounts for the majority 
of trouble removals both overall and in response to Torque Splits.  However, there has 
been a decline of Anticipator System removals over time with a corresponding increase 
in Fuel Governing system removals.   
Research Question Three 
 
We answer the final research question, “Should the overhaul times be changed?” 
by comparing the number of removals for trouble to removals for time and the average 
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Time Since Overhaul of each component at the time of trouble removal or failure.  We 
added this question to our study after discussion with CWO Hector Serrano, the Coast 
Guard Contract Manager for the LTS-101 engines.  Mr. Serrano mentioned that the Coast 
Guard was undertaking an effort to revise the current overhaul times.   
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Figure 18.  Comparison of MTSO at Failure and Scheduled Time of Overhaul 
 
Our initial analysis of time versus trouble removals shows this to be a serious issue for 
the Coast Guard HH-65.  Figure 18 shows that all overhauled components are failing at 
less than half their scheduled overhaul time. 
Time versus Trouble Removals 
 
Figure 19 shows a comparison of these trouble and time removals by component.  
We can see that the Temperature Compensator has the least amount of removals for 
trouble, while the Airflow Modulator has the most.  With the exception of the Fuel Pump 
and Overspeed Limiter, all components were removed more often for trouble than time.   
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Figure 19.  Comparison of Trouble Removals to Time Removals 
 
 
Mean time Since Overhaul versus Scheduled Time of Overhaul 
 
Next, we compare the scheduled overhaul time with the Mean Time Since 
Overhaul (MTSO) for those components that undergo scheduled overhaul.  We figure the 
MTSO by taking an average of the Time Since Overhaul (TSO) at the time of trouble 
removal for each component.  Figure 20 shows the difference in hours between the 
scheduled overhaul and the MTSO alongside the number of trouble removals for each 
component.  The higher the number, the more hours in advance of its regular scheduled 
overhaul time a component is failing.  A higher number could indicate a component with 
decreasing reliability.  Although, the Airflow Modulator has the greatest difference 
between its MTSO and Scheduled Overhaul Time and has the most trouble removals, this 
figure depicts no general trend or pattern between the difference between scheduled 
overhaul time and MTSO and the number of trouble removals.   
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Figure 20.  Comparison of Trouble Removals and Difference of Scheduled Overhaul Time and 
MTSO by Component 
 
 
We further analyze how the difference between the Scheduled Overhaul Times 
and the TSO at the time of failure affects the reliability using a logistic regression model.  
We use logistic regression for this analysis because we attempt to predict a binary 
response; in this case, fail or not fail prior to scheduled overhaul time.  This model (see 
Table 11) has an adjusted R2 of 0.49 and a P-value of less than 0.0001.  We find that the 
Time Since Overhaul and the difference between the Scheduled Overhaul Time squared 
are very strong predictors of component failure since they have a high Chi-Squared (χ2) 
test statistic.  Additionally, this model demonstrates that the Anticipator Actuator, the 
Fuel Control, the Overspeed Limiter, and the Fuel Pump also act as predictors of 
component failure.  This does not necessarily mean that these components are more likely 
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to fail; it only indicates that in combination with the TSO and Difference Squared, they 
are strong predictors of component failure. 
 
Table 11.  Logistic Regression Model Predicting Component Failure 
Predicting Component Failure Test Statistic P-value 
Whole Model 2765.009 <10-4 
Time Since Overhaul at time of Failure 638.43 < 0.0001 
Difference between Time Since Overhaul and 
Scheduled Overhaul Squared 295.82 < 0.0001 
Anticipator Actuator 573.02 < 0.0001 
Fuel Control 17.14 < 0.0001 
Overspeed Limiter 401.90 < 0.0001 
Fuel Pump 758.23 < 0.0001 
 
 
 
We also examine the relationship between Mean Time Between Overhauls and 
reliability using OLS regression.  In this case, the measure of reliability is the Mean Time 
Between Failure (MTBF).  This model (Adjusted R2 = 0.91) demonstrates that the Mean 
Time Since Overhaul and the Difference between the MTSO and the Scheduled Overhaul 
times are predictive of the MTBF regardless of component.   
 
Table 12.  OLS Model Predicting Mean Time Between Failures 
Predicting Component Failure (OLS) Estimate P-value 
Whole Model (n = 7)  0.0165 
Time Since Overhaul at time of Failure 3.305 0.0272 
Difference between Time Since Overhaul and 
Scheduled Overhaul -15.031 0.0272 
Difference between Time Since Overhaul and 
Scheduled Overhaul Squared 0.00616 0.0464 
 
 
 
Table 12 shows that the variables Mean Time Since Overhaul at time of failure, 
Difference between MTSO and scheduled overhaul times, and the Difference squared are 
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strong predictors of MTBF.  The model residuals meet the assumptions of constant 
variance, normality, and independence.  We find one major influential data point 
(Airflow Modulator) and one minor influential data point (Fuel Pump).  While these data 
points may weaken the predictive value of the model, we leave them in due to the small 
sample size of the model.  The fact that both the logistic and OLS model both show that 
the Difference between Time Since Overhaul and Scheduled Overhaul Squared as 
predictors of failure is significant.  We also note that both models have a relatively high 
R2 value in spite of the very low sample size (n=7).  Table 13 summarizes these findings. 
 
Table 13.  Significant Models and Predictor of Component Failure 
  
Logistic 
Model OLS Model 
R2 0.49 0.91 
Whole Model P-value 0.0000 0.0165 
(Time of Scheduled Overhaul - MTSO)2 (P-Value) < 0.0001 0.0272 
 
 
Table 14 shows the Scheduled Overhaul Times, the MTSO, and the Ratio of the 
two for each component.  The ratio gives us a measure of the relative performance of a 
given component relative to its scheduled overhaul time.  The closer this ratio is to one, 
the better the component is performing.  A number closer to zero indicates a poorer 
performing component.  We have listed the components from best performing to worst 
performing. 
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Table 14.  Summary of Scheduled Overhaul Times, MTSO and Ratio by Component 
COMPONENT 
Scheduled 
Time of 
Overhaul MTSO at Failure 
Ratio of MTSO to 
Scheduled 
Overhaul Time 
OVERSPEED LIMITER 1800 952.21 0.53 
TEMPERATURE COMPENSAT 2400 1117.18 0.47 
ANTICIPATOR ACTUATOR 1200 535.10 0.45 
POWER TURBINE GOVERNO 2400 1045.26 0.44 
FUEL CONTROL 2400 972.87 0.41 
PUMP FUEL 2400 857.76 0.36 
AIRFLOW MODULATOR ACT 2400 847.22 0.35 
 
 
 
Table 15 shows a summary of survival times for each component.  We take 
special note of the column labeled 75% Failures.  This column shows the MTSO at which 
75% of components fail.  An NA indicates that this component does not undergo regular 
overhaul. 
Table 15.  Summary of Survival Hours by Component 
Component Median Time Lower95% Upper95% 
25% 
Failures 
75% 
Failures 
Current 
Scheduled 
Overhaul 
Time 
AIRFLOW MODULATOR ACT 750 630 811 325 1312 2400 
ANTICIPATOR ACTUATOR 511 469 577 254 802 1200 
ANTICIPATOR CONTROL B 1258 1175 1346 762 1856 NA 
ENGINE ACC/RED GEARBO 4533 4442 4635 3852 5294 NA 
FUEL CONTROL 909 818 993 415 1524 2400 
OVERSPEED LIMITER 1050 843 1138 507 1423 1800 
POWER TURBINE GOVERNOR 1009 909 1104 475 1576 2400 
PUMP FUEL 842 746 891 405 1286 2400 
TEMPERATURE COMPENSAT 982 888 1211 594 1599 2400 
TORQUE TRANSDUCER 454 408 501 221 825 NA 
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Percentage of Time versus Trouble Removals 
 
Table 16 shows the average breakdown of time versus trouble removals by year 
and component.  Using the average of the yearly change in types of removals, we 
projected the breakdown of removals for 2003 assuming that conditions remain the same.   
 
Table 16.  Percentage of Time vs. Trouble Removals  
Component Average last 7 years 2003 Projection 
  Time Trouble Time Trouble 
Airflow Mod 14% 86% 4% 96% 
Power Turbine Governor 18% 82% 8% 92% 
Fuel Control 26% 74% 12% 88% 
Temperature Compensator 46% 54% 26% 74% 
Anticipator Act 44% 56% 45% 55% 
Fuel Pump 69% 31% 52% 48% 
Overspeed Limiter 70% 30% 81% 19% 
 
 
 
Figure 21 shows a graph of the projected removal breakdown for 2003.  As one 
can see, if the overhaul times remain the same, the number of trouble removals is likely 
to increase.   
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Figure 21.  Comparison of Projected Time versus Trouble Removals for 2003 
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The question now becomes, “What is the correct overhaul time for each 
component?”  Perhaps the 75% failure rate as shown in Table 15 is a good place to start.  
Table 17 shows the reduction in trouble removals that would likely result by setting the 
scheduled overhaul times at the 75% failure level. 
 
 
Table 17.  Removal Rate Comparison between Current and Projected Overhaul Times 
Component   Average last 7 years 
2003 Projection 
using current 
Overhaul times 
Projected 
removals using 
revised Overhaul 
times (75%) 
Reduction in 
trouble removals 
(Revised 
overhaul times) 
    Time Trouble Time Trouble Time Trouble  Trouble 
Percentage 14% 86% 4% 96% 31% 69% 28% 
Airflow Mod 
Count 12 81 8 179 58 129 21 
Percentage 44% 56% 45% 55% 60% 40% 27% 
Anticipator Act 
Count 46 56 75 91 100 66 14 
Percentage 26% 74% 12% 88% 35% 65% 26% 
Fuel Control 
Count 21 63 26 197 77 146 16 
Percentage 70% 30% 81% 19% 87% 13% 32% Overspeed 
Limiter Count 35 15 50 12 54 8 4 
Percentage 18% 82% 8% 92% 29% 71% 23% Power Turbine 
Governor Count 16 76 12 146 46 112 18 
Percentage 69% 31% 52% 48% 62% 38% 21% 
Fuel Pump 
Count 103 44 97 90 116 71 11 
Percentage 46% 54% 26% 74% 45% 55% 25% Temperature 
Compensator Count 14 15 6 17 10 13 4 
 
 
Figure 22 shows a side-by-side comparison of the projected trouble removals if no 
changes are made to the overhaul times against the predicted trouble removals using the 
75% failure rate. 
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Figure 22.  Comparison of 2003 Projected Trouble Removals  
 
 
Summary of Question Three 
 
It is readily apparent that the scheduled overhaul times are too long; with the 
exception of the Overspeed Limiter and the Fuel Pump, there are more removals for 
trouble than time for all components.  Additionally, all components are failing at an 
average of half their respective scheduled overhaul time or sooner.  By revising the 
current scheduled overhaul times to the 75% failure level, the number of trouble removals 
could be reduced by an average of 25%. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The total number of trouble removals has increased over time; however, we find 
no correlation between time and trouble removals by individual component.  We find a 
strong relationship between the type of component and the number of trouble removals.  
There appears to be no relationship between the average age of a component and the 
number of trouble removals or the number of mishaps attributed to a component.  The 
type of component shows a strong correlation to the type of malfunction.  Similarly, the 
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type of system shows a strong correlation to the type of malfunction.  There has been a 
slight decline of removals of anticipator system components over time with a 
corresponding increase in fuel governing system removals.  We find that the scheduled 
overhaul times are too long, resulting in an excessive number of trouble removals for all 
components.   
This chapter describes the types of statistical methodologies we use in this study, 
namely contingency table analysis, OLS regression analysis and logistic regression 
analysis.  We describe the mishap data and component removal data and discuss the 
modifications and limitations of each.  We apply the discussed statistical methods on the 
data to answer each research question individually.  In the next chapter, we discuss the 
findings from this chapter and address research question four, “what primary factors are 
impeding powerplant improvements of the HH-65?” 
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 IV.  Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 
In this chapter, we answer research question four.  Additionally, we discuss our 
conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for future research.   
 
Research Question Four 
The forth research questions asks, “What primary factors are impeding 
powerplant improvements of the HH-65?”  Through an examination of the literature and 
data analysis, we find the lack of HH-65 powerplant improvements due to four main 
reasons; Coast Guard culture, apparent reliability improvement after the LTC lawsuit, 
lack of funding, failure to measure intangible costs associated with engine’s lack of 
power, and political pressures.   
Coast Guard Culture 
 
Prevalent within Coast Guard culture is the attitude of doing more with less.  
Admiral James Loy, former Coast Guard Commandant, recognized that the eventuality of 
this attitude is that one may end up doing everything with nothing (Loy, 1999b).  Getting 
the job done, whether it a rescue or a drug bust, in spite of old or unsafe equipment is 
what the Coast Guard has done for over 200 years.  Unfortunately, it is this very attitude 
that has hampered improvements of the HH-65.  Coast Guard leaders accepted the 
aircraft in spite of its inadequate power reserve.  Coast Guard pilots continued to accept 
and accomplish missions in spite of the aircraft’s lack of power and unreliability.  The 
fact that these missions were accomplished made for an insidious complacency and lulled 
the organization into a false sense of security (Loy, 1999a).  Like the driver who 
continues to drive without a seatbelt because he has never had an accident, the Coast 
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Guard continues to fly the HH-65 because those who fly it continue to get the job done in 
spite of the aircraft’s problems.  The Coast Guard must take some responsibility for the 
lack of improvements to the HH-65.   
Reliability Improves 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, after the initial problems, the reliability of the LTS-
101 improved, particularly after the Coast Guard won its lawsuit against TLC in 1990.  
This, coupled with the subsequent Power-by-the-Hour agreement, caused the Coast 
Guard to stick with the LTS-101 and scrap Proof-of-Concept testing of the T800 since it 
was economical to do so and there were no serious safety issues at the time (Kandebo, 
1990b:25).   
Lack of Funding 
 
The Coast Guard’s history of budget shortfalls is arguably the most influential of 
factors hampering improvements to the HH-65 powerplant.  Each upgrade or 
improvement must show a positive return on investment.  Proving a direct relationship 
between airframe weight and cost savings has been problematic.  It has been much easier 
to upgrade other systems such as avionics due to obsolescence and the more obvious cost 
benefit of such upgrades.  This approach has failed to account for the full impact of the 
intangible and life-cycle costs of increased aircraft weight and reduced power reserves in 
terms of safety and operational capability (Schlatter, 1997:14).   
Intangible Costs 
 
The Coast Guard underestimated the importance of intangible costs associated 
with the HH-65.  While difficult to measure, these types of costs are nonetheless very real 
 
64 
and potentially very costly, especially when calculated over the service life of the 
helicopter.  These costs include, but are not limited to the following: 
• Lack of availability – Aircraft is unavailable due to maintenance. 
 
• Mission effectiveness – The aircraft is available but is unable to launch or is 
required to abort due to a maintenance problem. 
 
• Lack of Power Reserve – The aircraft is unable to perform the type of missions it 
was originally designed for due to weight growth and lack of power reserve (See 
Table 1, page 10). 
 
In terms of these intangibles, the current engine has cost the Coast Guard far more 
than has been saved by not upgrading early on.  The Coast Guard has used availability as 
a measure of reliability throughout the history of the HH-65.  Dispatch failure, which is 
an indirect measure of reliability and mission effectiveness, has only been measured since 
1997.  The lack of power reserve is a critical aspect of mission effectiveness.  However, 
neither dispatch failure nor availability measure the missions not attempted.   
Political Issues 
 
As the Coast Guard searches for the best value in a new HH-65 power plant, 
politics have slowed the improvement process.  The Coast Guard’s interest in the 
Turbomeca engine as replacement for the LTS-101 has resulted in the perception that the 
service is “turning its back on its proven LTS-101” (Harvey, 2002:1).  As this study has 
shown, however, the reliability of the LTS-101 was anything but proven until 1999 and 
the engine has never been a proven performer in terms of power reserve.   
The Coast Guard is considering replacing the current engines with the Turbomeca 
Arriel 2C2.  The world’s leading helicopter engine maker, Turbomeca is a subsidiary of 
Snecma Group.  Turbomeca teamed with Snecma Group in 2000.  Previously Société 
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Nationale d'Étude et de Construction de Moteurs d'Avion and the oldest engine maker in 
the world, Snecma Group is the leading European Aerospace Company and is the fourth 
ranked engine-maker in the world.  It is 97% owned by the French government ("First 
Flight," 2002).  Although Turbomeca is foreign-owned, the Arriel 2C2 engine is 
manufactured in Prairie View, Texas (Couch, 2003a). 
The service’s interest in Turbomeca has drawn the attention of some in Congress 
who are concerned about off-shore purchases – especially those from French companies 
(Harvey, 2002).  The Coast Guard is seen by some in Washington and the U. S. 
helicopter industry as having a tendency for going toward non-domestic sources to meet 
its operational requirements.  Along with the French-made HH-65, the service also leases 
the Italian-made Augusta A-109 for its anti-drug armed helicopters (Harvey, 2002).  
Additionally, the European Aeronautics Defence and Space Company (EADS) has been 
subcontracted by the Integrated Coast Guard Systems to provide the Coast Guard with a 
new Maritime Surveillance Aircraft and upgrade the HH-65 as part of the recently 
awarded $17 million Deepwater contract (Tiron, 2002:3).   
The Coast Guard has had to defend its interest in the French-owned Turbomeca 
engines.  South Carolina Senator Fritz Hollings has put pressure on the Coast Guard to 
work with Honeywell to assist with the remedy of the HH-65 engine (Davis, 2003).  The 
Honeywell plant that manufactures and overhauls the LTS-101 is located in Greer, South 
Carolina.  Senator Hollings took issue with the Coast Guard’s expenditure of federal 
dollars on a foreign manufacturer (Turbomeca) in the service’s effort to upgrade the HH-
65 engines.  The Coast Guard received a total of $14 million from the FY 2000 and FY 
2001 Department of Transportation Appropriations bill to upgrade the HH-65 engines.  
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From this, the Coast Guard provided $5.9 million to Honeywell to assist them in 
competing for the engine production contract (Davis, 2003).   
Perhaps to silence this type of opposition, Eurocopter America recently purchased 
a facility in Mississippi for the manufacture of components of the Eurocopter AS350, 
EC130, and AS355 helicopters (Harvey, 2002; Tiron, 2002:4).  More likely, though, 
Eurocopter and its parent company, EADS, are aiming to gain a strategic foothold in the 
U. S. Market and strengthen ties with DOD.  Currently, the U. S. represents 7% of EADS 
defense revenues and the company would like to increase this number (Mason, 2002:2). 
Experts believe this increased competition will invigorate U. S. companies by giving 
them some much-needed competition.  There is also a fear that if the U. S. shuts out the 
European companies, the Europeans may shut out U.S. companies (Tiron, 2002:1).  
Frank Cevasco, former Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense believes that the 
U.S. military cannot afford to shut out European firms; “If the U. S. government is 
perceived as being even more protectionist [than it is now], I fear that we will get an even 
bigger reaction from the European Companies.  They can harm us much more than we 
can hurt them” (Tiron, 2002:1).  
Many sectors of the U. S. defense industry now consist of single suppliers.  Some 
see this lack of competition as a hindrance to a healthy and competitive acquisition 
process.  The introduction of Europeans firms will give the government more than one 
alternative in the source selection process (Tiron, 2002:2).   
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
While the current engine alone may not be suffering from severe reliability 
problems, it does suffer from a severe lack of power.  The current engine has a 
documented power deficit of 23% (Burgess, 2003).  As discussed in Chapter Two, Power 
Required vs. Power Available, this severely limits the mission capability of the HH-65.  
This also means that the current engine provides no room for the additional weight 
growth required for any AUF capabilities.  The two engines under consideration for the 
HH-65 powerplant upgrade are the Honeywell HTS-900 and the Turbomeca Arriel 2C2.  
Of all of the commercial Dauphin operators in the world, the Coast Guard HH-65 is the 
only one not powered by Arriel engines (Burgess, 2003).  The Honeywell HTS-900 
provides a 14% power increase over the current version and is predicted to save $130M 
over a complete replacement (Wagstaff, 2003).  On the other hand, the Turbomeca 2C2 
provides a 40% increase.  Both engines will require a main gearbox upgrade to handle the 
increase in power (Padfield, 2003).  If the Coast Guard goes with the 850, the HH-65 will 
have a 9% power deficit while the 2C2 will provide a 17% power reserve.  While the 
choice may seem obvious, even a 17% power reserve may not be enough to provide the 
HH-65 with the power it needs to accomplish AUF missions. 
Fuel Control 
 
While the reliability of the engine itself may not be decreasing, the existing 
engine control system, which consists of the fuel-governing and anticipator systems, 
suffers from a severe reliability problem.  Developed solely for the Coast Guard HH-65, 
this engine control system came with many problems.  Malfunctions with this system are 
both difficult to diagnose in-flight and troubleshoot and repair on the ground (Connor, 
 
68 
Devoe et al., 1998:8)  As our analysis in Chapter Three showed, the great majority of 
malfunctions associated with the current powerplant are due to the Anticipator and Fuel-
Governing System.  We find the Torque Transducer and the Anticipator Control Box, 
both components of the anticipator system, to be the least reliable components associated 
with the engine.  Additionally, of the ten most frequent malfunctions during the period of 
study, six are directly related to either the fuel governing or anticipator system. 
The decline of anticipator system removals and concurrent increase in fuel-
governing system removals over the last six years is most likely due to a faulty Power 
Turbine Governor.  As discussed in Chapter Two, Recent Events, maintenance experts 
identified this component as faulty earlier this year and recalled it from service.  As of 
this writing, the recall is 80% complete with only low-time PTGs still in service.  This 
recall was necessary in resolving a critical problem; however, it only addressed an 
immediate safety issue and does not address the overall problem with the current systems, 
which are woefully obsolete and very costly.   
An improved and updated fuel control system is just as important as an improved 
powerplant.  It is imperative that the Coast Guard replace this system with a more reliable 
one.  One option under consideration to replace the current system is an updated version 
of a Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC).  Like an automobile fuel injection 
system, FADEC works electronically to deliver the precise ratio of fuel and air to the 
engine.  A FADEC system would replace the current fuel governing and anticipator 
systems.  Considered the industry standard for helicopter engine control, FADEC is safer 
and easier to maintain than the current system.  It also allows for future power growth to 
accommodate the inevitable mission gross weight increases that come with increased 
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operational requirements (Connor, Devoe et al., 1998:8).  A FADEC system would save 
the Coast Guard $725K a year (1998 dollars) in Power by the Hour costs (HH65A 
Performance Study, 1998).  The LTS engine under consideration does not include a 
FADEC while the Arriel engine includes a proven duel channel FADEC called the 
Digital Engine Electronic Control Unit (Lovejoy, 2003).  Honeywell began development 
of a FADEC engine in January 2003.  Certification is expected mid-2004 (Couch, 2003c). 
Political Pressure 
 
The pressure on the Coast Guard to buy from domestic sources misses the big 
picture.  The Coast Guard needs the HH-65 to perform as originally designed.  Because it 
is a small service, many American companies are not even interested in working with the 
Coast Guard.  Forcing the Coast Guard to buy from a domestic source that cannot provide 
the best engine for the money could cost taxpayers more in terms of loss of mission 
effectiveness and diminished ability to protect the homeland.  In responding to this 
political pressure, the Coast Guard needs to focus on how intangible costs figure into the 
long-term cost of an underpowered HH-65 and communicate these costs to Congress. 
Final Analysis 
 
If it hopes to expand the mission capability and increase the safety of the HH-65, 
the Coast Guard must improve the current powerplant.  This improvement must address 
reliability as well as power reserve.  Table 18 shows a comparison between upgrade 
options.   
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Table 18.  Analysis of Upgrade Options 
Alternative Power Increase 
Resulting 
Power 
Cost of 
FADEC 
HTS-900 14% -9% not included 
Arriel 2C2 40% 17% included 
 
 
This does not tell the whole story, however.  While this study focused on learning 
from the past, to make the best choice, decision makers must look ahead and account for 
future intangible costs involved in this upgrade.  Although various attempts have been 
made to capture the mission impact of the HH-65’s lack of power, there is no Coast 
Guard-wide standard measure (CG Budget Challenges, 2000:3; CG LANTAREA Oct 16, 
2003; Vigus, 2003).  The Coast Guard has recognized the need to develop a metric that 
captures the missions not attempted due to the HH-65’s lack of power (CG LANTAREA 
Oct 16, 2003).  This should include any mission that could have been accomplished if the 
HH-65 met its original design requirements.  (Schlatter, 1997:1-3) 
 
Suggestions for Further Study 
This study addressed the reliability of the HH-65 helicopter.  As discussed above, 
a study of the intangible costs related to the poor reliability of the LTS-101, lack of 
power reserve, and complicated fuel-governing system may be useful.  A study of this 
type may help the Coast Guard and other agencies avoid costly mistakes in the future by 
highlighting the importance of intangible but real costs.  In addition, a comparison of 
expected life-cycle costs of any upgrade or replacement engine would be useful in 
assisting senior leaders make the correct decision in their effort to upgrade the HH-65.  
Additionally, a more complete analysis of proper overhaul times is necessary.  
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Addressing issues related to the cost of a trouble removal versus a time removal and the 
optimum mix of both is salient to this issue. 
 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we answer research question four.  We find five factors that have 
hampered improvements to the HH-65 powerplant, namely the prevailing Coast Guard 
culture, an apparent improvement in reliability in 1990, lack of funding, failure to fully 
quantify intangible costs, and various political issues.  We conclude that the lack of 
power reserve and an obsolete and unreliable fuel control system are the critical issues 
that continue to hamper the mission capability of the HH-65 both now and in the future.  
We recommend that the decision on any improvements to the HH-65 be made with a 
long-term view and must include a comprehensive analysis of the costs associated with 
an underpowered aircraft.  Finally, we discussed topics for future research including a 
study of the intangible costs incurred by sticking with the LTS-101, a comparison of life-
cycle costs between the HTS-900 and Arriel 2C2, and in-depth analysis of the cost of 
trouble versus time removals. 
 
Last Word 
This study revealed three critical issues associated with the HH-65 powerplant, 
namely, lack of power reserve associated with the LTS-101-750, poor reliability 
associated with the fuel-control system, and excessive trouble removals due to excessive 
time between schedule overhaul times.  Political pressure is forcing the Coast Guard 
toward a less than optimum fix.  The fact that there has been no recent injury or loss of 
life as a result of these problems is a testament to the skill of the aircrews who fly the 
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HH-65 and who continue to make due with an underpowered aircraft every time they fly.  
However, the Coast Guard cannot afford to allow this apparent success to lull them into a 
less than optimum solution.  Recent restrictions imposed on HH-65 (See Recent Events, 
page 19) operations indicate that Coast Guard leaders recognize the criticality of this 
situation.  Congress must allow the Coast Guard to give its aircrews the proper tools to 
safely accomplish the mission.  The problems associated with the LTS-101 and HH-65 
are well documented.  Congressional and Coast Guard leaders have a responsibility to 
those who fly the HH-65 as well as to the public they serve to correct the shortfalls of this 
critical asset.  This is not only to avoid a potential mishap, but also in order to accomplish 
the missions for which the helicopter was originally designed.   
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 Appendix A: Definition of Terms 
 
Fuel Governing System – pneumatically regulates fuel flow in accordance with engine 
power demands and ambient temperature (HH-65 Flight Manual, 1996:1-8,9; LTS-101-
750B-2, 2003:49; Barbazon, 2003). 
 
Power Turbine Governor (PTG) – regulates speed of power turbine drive train 
system (Np).  Uses pneumatic signals - regulated pressure (Pr) and N2 governor pressure 
(Pg) - to reset the fuel control and set speed of free turbine (Ng).  PTG is controlling 
governor when fuel control level (FFCL) is forward through 90% Ng.   
 
Overspeed Limiter (OSL) – Redundant governor to the PTG.  Coupled directly to 
the fuel control through the Py air line.  If Np exceeds 112%, the OSL will open the Py 
bleed air port to reduce engine speed.   
 
Fuel Control Unit/ Ng Governor (FCU) – Regulates gas generator (Ng) speed 
through pneumatic signals received from temperature compensator (Px) and (Py) to 
regulate fuel flow to meet engine power demands.  Monitors Ng speed through flyweight 
assembly and pneumatic signals from PTG. 
 
Fuel Pump (FP) – delivers pressurized fuel to fuel control unit (FCU)  
 
Temperature Compensator T1 Sensor (TEMPCOMP) – regulates N2 governor 
pressure (Pg), compressor discharge air (Pc), and deliver bleed air (Px) to fuel control.  
Prevents compressor surges. 
 
One Engine Inoperative (OEI) One minute power setting – electromechanical 
system that resets the fuel control to provide access to higher power setting for use in 
extreme emergency.  Must be armed prior to use by button on bottom of collective.  Once 
armed, increased power (up to 15% shp) is available upon collective demand. 
 
Anticipator System – 1) provides input to the PTG to maintain constant rotor speed (Nr) 
during main rotor pitch changes.  2) Balances engine torques during steady state 
operations (HH-65 Flight Manual, 1996:1-9; LTS-101-750B-2, 2003:75-76; Barbazon, 
2003). 
 
Anticipator Control Box (ACB) – amplifies and transmits electronic signals from 
dual potentiometer to anticipator actuators (AAM).  In addition, uses input from copilot’s 
torque indicator to balance torque between engines during steady state operations. 
 
Anticipator Actuator Motor (AAM) – driven by signals from ACB.  AAM 
positions the free power turbine governor (PTG) to maintain free power turbine speed 
(Np) in proportion to collective movement.  During steady state operations, individual 
torque signals are compared for any differences in torque output.  If there is a difference, 
 
74 
an electronic signal is sent to drive the engine with the lower torque output to match the 
torque on the opposite engine. 
 
Copilot’s Torque Indicator – sends input signal to anticipator control box (ACB) 
for torque balancing during steady state operations. 
 
Dual Potentiometer – varies 15 VDC electronic signal to anticipator control box 
(ACB) based on collective lever linkage position. 
 
Torque Transducer (QXSND) – Converts oil pressure from ARG into electronic 
signal that is sent to copilot’s torque indicator.  Receives electronic signal from copilot’s 
torque indicator and transmits differential voltage back to indictor.  
 
Engine Anticipator Switches – secures power to the anticipator actuators (AAM).  
With power secured the position of the AAM is dependent upon collective position – 
acceleration and deceleration will be extremely slow. 
 
Air Flow Modulator (AFM) – Designed to restrict engine air intake during low rotor 
speed operations in order to improve engine surge/stall margin.  Controlled by 
compressor bleed air (P3) and ambient pressure (Pa) (LTS-101-750B-2, 2003:42; 
Barbazon, 2003). 
 
Accessory Reduction Gearbox (ARG) – provides main support of the engine within the 
airframe.  Also slows Ng and Np speeds to drive various components mounted on the 
ARG. (HH-65 Flight Manual, 19961-4; Barbazon, 2003) 
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 Appendix B: Data Categories 
 
Categories of Component Removal 
Data 
SERIAL NUMBER 
COMPONENT 
SYSTEM 
REASON REMOVED 
FAIL 
DATE OF REMOVAL 
TIME SINCE NEW (HOURS) 
TIME SINCE OVERHAUL (HOURS) 
NORMAL TIME OF OVERHAUL 
TIME BETWEEN MAINT ACTION 
ENGINE OR AIRFRAME NUMBER 
ACTIVITIY 
MALFUNCTION (SPECIFIC REASON FOR 
REMOVAL) 
CROSS COMPONENT 
COMMENTS 
 
 
Categories of Safety Data 
Mishap # 
possible faulty PTG 
Date 
Year 
Aircraft 
Cost 
Type 
Phase 
Mission 
Action 
Faulty Component 
Multi component 
comments 
Ship Ops 
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  Appendix C: Torque Splits - Classified by Comments 
  
Comments Coded as Torque Splits 
Count of 
Comment 
TORQUE SPLITS 141 
Q SPLITS 68 
TORQUE SPLITS. 50 
TQ SPLITS 25 
REMOVED DUE TO TORQUE 23 
Q-SPLITS 21 
Q SPLITS. 19 
REMOVED FOR TROUBLESHOOTING 15 
REMOVED FOR TORQUE SPLITS 15 
CAUSING TORQUE SPLITS 13 
REMOVED FOR TORQUE SPLITS. 12 
CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS 11 
TORQUE SPLIT 9 
REMOVED FOR TORQUE SPLIT 7 
REPLACED DUE TO TORQUE 6 
CAUSING Q SPLITS 6 
TORQUE SPLITS ON DECK. 5 
SUSPECT CAUSING TORQUE 5 
REPLACED FOR TORQUE SPLITS 5 
REPLACED DUE TO Q SPLITS. 5 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLITS. 5 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLITS 5 
Q SPLIT 5 
TROUBLESHOOTING Q SPLITS 4 
SUSPECT CAUSE OF TORQUE 4 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLIT 4 
REMOVED FOR 4 
INTERMITTANT TORQUE SPLITS 4 
CAUSING TORQUE SPLITS. 4 
CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS. 4 
TROUBLESHOOTING TORQUE 3 
"Q" SPLITS 3 
TORQUE SPLIT. 3 
SUSPECTED CAUSE OF TORQUE 3 
REPLACED FOR TORQUE SPLITS. 3 
REMOVED DUE TO TORQUE SPLIT 3 
REMOVED DUE TO Q SPLITS 3 
Q-SPLITS. 3 
INTERMITTENT TORQUE SPLITS 3 
COMPLETED FOR TORQUE SPLIT 3 
CAUSES Q SPLITS 3 
UNABLE TO MATCH TORQUES 2 
TROUBLE SHOOTING TORQUE 2 
TORQUESPLITS 2 
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TORQUE SPLITS IN MID RANGE 2 
TORQUE SPLITS AT MID RANGE 2 
TORQUE SPLITS AT FLAT PITCH 2 
TORQUE SPLITS AT FLAT 2 
TORQUE SPLITS 20% 2 
TORQ SPLITS 2 
TORGUE SPLITS 2 
SUSPECTED TO CAUSE TORQUE 2 
REPLACED FOR TORQUE SPLIT 2 
REPLACED FOR Q SPLITS 2 
REPLACED FOR 2 
REPLACED DUE TO Q-SPLITS. 2 
REMOVED SUSPECTED FUEL PUMP 2 
REMOVED FOR TQ SPLITS AS 2 
REMOVED DUE TO Q SPLITS. 2 
REMOVED DUE TO 2 
REMOVED AND REPLACED FOR 2 
Q SPLITS ON DECK 2 
Q SPLITS AT FLAT PITCH 2 
POSSIBLE CAUSE OF Q SPLITS 2 
MID RANGE Q SPLITS OF 20% 2 
INTERMITTENT TORQUE SPLIT 2 
CONTROL BOX CAUSED TORQUE 2 
CAUSED Q SPLITS 2 
COMPLETED DUE TO TORQUE 2 
CHANGED FOR TORQUE SPLITS 2 
CHANGED DUE TO TORQUE 2 
CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS AT 2 
CAUSED TORQUE SPLITS. 2 
WOULD NOT OPEN; Q SPLITS 1 
CAUSED TORQUE SPLITS. WOULD 1 
CAUSED TQ SPLITS 1 
CAUSES 20% TORQUE SPLITS IN 1 
CAUSES 6% TORQUE SPLITS 1 
CAUSES FLAT PITCH Q-SPLITS, 1 
CAUSES LOW SIDE TORQUE 1 
CAUSES MID RANGE Q SPLITS. 1 
CAUSES MID RANGE TORQUE 1 
CAUSES OF SPLITS, CONTINUES 1 
CAUSES Q SPLIT 1 
30-50% ENG SPLIT DURING ALL 1 
CAUSES Q SPLITS. 1 
CAUSES TORQUE 1 
CAUSES TORQUE SPLIT 1 
CAUSES TORQUE SPLIT AT MED. 1 
#2 ANTICIPATOR ACTUATOR 1 
CAUSED TORQUE SPLIT WITH 1 
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CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS AT ALL 1 
CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS AT LOW 1 
CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS ON THE 1 
CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS, IS 1 
16 Q (#1 ENG PROBLEM SIDE) 1 
CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS... 1 
CAUSIING Q SPLITS AT MID 1 
CAUSING "Q" SPLITS AND 1 
CAUSING 30% TORQUE SPLIT 1 
CAUSING INTERMITTENT TORQUE 1 
CAUSING MID RANGE Q SPLITS 1 
CAUSING MID RANGE TQ SPLITS 1 
CAUSING MID-RANGE TORQUE 1 
CAUSING Q APLITS, MOTOR 1 
CAUSING Q SPLIT 1 
#2 SIDE DRIVING HIGH 1 
CAUSING SPLITS, WON'T 1 
CAUSING TORQUE 1 
CAUSING TORQUE SPLIT 1 
#1 ENGINE LOW 10% AT 50% 1 
CAUSING TORQUE SPLITS 8-10% 1 
CAUSING TORQUE SPLITS ABOVE 1 
CAUSING TORQUE SPLITS BY 1 
CAUSING TORQUE SPLITS ON 1 
15-20% TORQUE SPLIT WITH 1 
CHANGE DUE TO Q SPLITS 1 
CHANGED AS A PRECAUTION 1 
CHANGED AS A PRECAUTION DUE 1 
CHANGED DUE TO MID-RANGE 1 
CAUSED Q SPLITS. HIGH TIME 1 
CHANGED FOR "Q" SPLIT 1 
CHANGED FOR ERRACTIC 1 
CHANGED FOR FLAT PITCH 1 
CHANGED FOR MID-RANGE 1 
CHANGED FOR TORQUE SPLIT 1 
CAUSED Q SPLITS DURING 1 
CHANGED FOR TORQUE SPLITS. 1 
CHANGED IN CONJUNCTION WITH 1 
CHANGED OUT FOR TORQUE 1 
CHANGING AS TROUBLESHOOTING 1 
COMPLETED DUE TO Q SPLIT 1 
CAUSED Q SPLITS AND MADE 1 
30% TORQUE SPLITS OBSERVED 1 
CONSISTENT Q SPLIT 1 
CONTROL BOX CASUSES Q 1 
CAUSED Q SPLITS & NP 1 
CONTROL BOX CAUSING TORQUE 1 
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CONTROL BOX REMOVED DUE TO 1 
CONTROL BOX WOULD NOT HOLD 1 
CORRODED, CAUSING Q SPLITS 1 
CORROSION & TORQUE SPLITS 1 
CREATED TORQUE SPLIT. 1 
CREATED TORQUE SPLITS 1 
CREATED TORQUE SPLITS AT 1 
CREATED TORQUE SPLITS IN 1 
CREATES 8-10% TQ SPLIT AT 1 
CUASED Q SPLITS 1 
CUASES TORQUE SPLITS. 1 
CUASING Q SPLITS 1 
CUASING Q SPLITS HI SIDE 1 
DIVERGENT TORQUE SPLITS IN 1 
DROOPING NR AND Q SPLITS 1 
DROPPING NR AND Q SPLITS 1 
ENGINE TORQUE 1 
ENGINE TORQUE SPILT 1 
ERRADIC OPERATION CAUSING 1 
FAILED OPS DUE TO CHETING @ 1 
FAULTY TQ TRANSDUCER 1 
FLAT PITCH Q SPLIT MORE 1 
FLAT PITCH Q SPLITS 1 
FLAT PITCH TORQUE SPLITS, 1 
FOR TORQUE SPLITS 1 
FOUND FAULTY DURING 1 
FOUND TO CAUSE TORQUE 1 
FOUND TORQUE SPILT #2 NG 1 
FUEL CONTROL CAUSING TORQUE 1 
FUEL CONTROL FOUND LEAKING 1 
HIGH POWER Q SPLITS 1 
HIGH POWER SETTING 5% 1 
HIGH RANGE Q SPLITS 1 
HIGH SIDE TORQUE SPLITS 1 
INSTALLED DUE FLAT PITCH 1 
INTER MITTENT TQ SPLITS 1 
INTERAL LEAK,  TORQUE 1 
INTERMINITTIN FLUCTUATIONS 1 
15% TORQUE SPLIT, REMOVED 1 
INTERMITTANT TORQUE SPLITS. 1 
INTERMITTENT Q SPLITS AT 1 
CAUSED MINOR Q SPLITS AT 1 
30% TORQUE SPLITS 1 
INTERMITTENT TORQUE SPLITS. 1 
INTERMITTENT TORRQUE SPLITS 1 
INTERNAL LOCK NUT ON SET 1 
LOW AND MIDRANGE Q-SPLITS 1 
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LOW ENGINE SPEED AND TORQUE 1 
MGB IS 40 - 70% "Q" RANGE 1 
MGT AND NG SPLITS. SUSPECT 1 
MID AND HIGH RANGE Q 1 
MID RANGE Q 1 
MID RANGE Q SPLIT, FOUND #2 1 
MID RANGE Q SPLITS 1 
CAUSED #1 ENG ANTICIPATOR 1 
MID RANGE Q-SLPITS 1 
MID RANGE Q-SPLITS 1 
MID RANGE RATCHETING CAUSES 1 
MID RANGE TORQUE SPLIT 1 
MID RANGE TORQUE SPLITS 1 
MID RANGE TORQUE SPLITS. 1 
MIDRANGE Q-SPILTS WITH OEI 1 
MOTOR RACHETING CAUSING 1 
MOTOR RATCHETS, CAUSES Q 1 
NOT OPENING CAUSING Q 1 
NP2 78% WHEN TESTED FOR 1 
NR DROOPS/Q SPLIT ON DECK, 1 
OCCOLATING FROM FULL OPEN 1 
OPENED AT 110 PSI CAUSED 1 
OSCILLATING CAUSING Q 1 
PART OFF SUSPECT COMPONENT 1 
PART REMOVED FOR TORQUE 1 
PERFORMED DUE TO TORQUE 1 
PLUNGER NOT MOVING, CAUSING 1 
POSSIBLE CAUSE OF Q SPLIT 1 
CAUSE OF TORQUE SPLITS 1 
POSSIBLE CAUSE TORQUE 1 
POSSIBLY CAUSING LOW END Q 1 
PRODUCING TQ SPLITS. 1 
PT GOV IS SUSPECTED TO BE 1 
PT GOVENOR ARM CONTACTING 1 
PT GOVERNOR SHOW TO MATCH Q 1 
10% TORQUE SPLITS - TROUBLE 1 
Q SPLIT #1 HIGH IN ALL 1 
Q SPLIT #2 ENG Q LOW 20% 1 
Q SPLIT AT GROUND IDLE (6%) 1 
Q SPLIT IN FLIGHT, FOUND TO 1 
Q SPLIT R1 LOOSE 1 
Q SPLIT TROUBLESHOOTING 1 
Q SPLIT. 1 
Q SPLIT.  #2Q WENT TO FULL 1 
"CHANGED FOR TORQUE SPLITS" 1 
Q SPLITS - #2 DROPPED TO 1 
Q SPLITS - 7TO8% ON-DECK 1 
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Q SPLITS - FOUND MODULATOR 1 
Q SPLITS #2 ENG 1 
Q SPLITS #2 SLUGGISH TO 1 
Q SPLITS @MAX CONTINOUS 1 
Q SPLITS 15% FLAT PITCH 1 
Q SPLITS 2-5% @ MID RANGE 1 
Q SPLITS AND ENGINE IS HOT 1 
CAUSE OF Q-SPLITS. 1 
Q SPLITS AT FLAT PITCH. 1 
Q SPLITS AT FLAT SPLIT 1 
Q SPLITS AT HIGH RANGE 1 
Q SPLITS AT HIGHER POWER 1 
Q SPLITS AT MID TO HIGH 1 
Q SPLITS FLUCTUATING 1 
Q SPLITS IN ALL RANGES. 1 
Q SPLITS IN MID RANGE 1 
Q SPLITS IN MID-RANGE 1 
Q SPLITS LOW POWER 1 
Q SPLITS MID RANGE 1 
Q SPLITS OF 15% WITH #2 LOW 1 
Q SPLITS ON #1 + #2 ENG 1 
Q SPLITS ON 6579, 1 
CASUING TORQUE SPLITS 1 1 
Q SPLITS ON DECK #1 ENG 1 
Q SPLITS ON DECK 4-8% 1 
Q SPLITS ON DECK 5% 1 
Q SPLITS ON DECK FLAT 1 
Q SPLITS TROUBLESHOOTING 1 
Q SPLITS TRUBLEHOOTING 1 
Q SPLITS, ANTICIPATOR MOTOR 1 
Q SPLITS, FLUCTATION 1 
Q SPLITS, FLUX 1 
Q SPLITS, MODULATOR WOULD 1 
Q SPLITS, NO SCHR 1 
Q SPLITS, NOT CLOSING ALL 1 
#1 ENG HIGH END Q-SPLITS 1 
Q SPLITS. ANTICIPATOR BOX 1 
Q SPLITS. MOTOR SIZED 1 
Q SPLITS; FAILED TO FULLY 1 
Q SPLITS; WOULD NOT OPEN 1 
Q SPLITS'S RATHETING 1 
Q SPLITS--TORQUE TRANSDUCER 1 
Q WOULD NOT MATCH 1 
Q'S WOULD NOT MATCH. 1 
Q'S WOULDN'T MATCH AT MAX 1 
QSPILTS 1 
Q-SPLIT 1 
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Q-SPLIT 40-50 % MGB Q, #1 1 
Q-SPLIT RATCHING MOTOR 1 
QSPLIT TROUBLESHOOTING 1 
#1 ENG "Q" 15-20% LOWER 1 
Q-SPLITS - FROZEN 1 
Q-SPLITS (OUT 0F CAL) 1 
Q-SPLITS' 7-8% ON DECK. 1 
QSPLITS AIRFLOW MODULATOR 1 
Q-SPLITS DURING TEST FLIGHT 1 
Q-SPLITS- LOW SIDE FAILURE. 1 
QSPLITS ON DECK 4-8 % 1 
Q-SPLITS ON DECK.  NP'S 1 
QSPLITS SEIZED. 1 
Q-SPLITS TROUBLESHOOTING 1 
Q-SPLITS, #1 ENG HIGH 1 
Q-SPLITS, ALSO CAUSED ENG 1 
QSPLITS. 1 
3.2% HIGH ON BOTH SIDES 1 
Q-SPLITS. ANTICIPATOR 1 
R&R TO CORRECT TORQUE 1 
R/R FOR FLAT PITCH Q SPLITS 1 
R/R FOR TQ SPLITS 1 
RATCHETING/CAUSES Q SPLITS. 1 
READING WAS 10%-15% LESS 1 
REMOCED FOR Q-SPLITS 1 
REMOVD FOR TORQUE SPLITS 1 
REMOVED - SUSPECT CAUSING Q 1 
REMOVED AND REPLACED #1 Q 1 
REMOVED AND REPLACED DUE TO 1 
BOX REPLACED DUE TO TORQUE 1 
REMOVED AND REPLACED FOR Q 1 
REMOVED AND REPLACED W/RFI 1 
REMOVED AND RPLACED W/RFI 1 
REMOVED ANTICIPATOR CONTROL 1 
BOX CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS. 1 
REMOVED DUE TO 20% TORQUE 1 
REMOVED DUE TO A 6% Q SPLIT 1 
REMOVED DUE TO EXCESIVE, 1 
REMOVED DUE TO FLAT PITCH 1 
REMOVED DUE TO LAGGING 1 
REMOVED DUE TO MODULATOR 1 
25-30%  TQ SPLIT #2 HIGH 1 
REMOVED DUE TO Q SPLITS & 1 
REMOVED DUE TO Q SPLITS AND 1 
REMOVED DUE TO Q SPLITS AT 1 
ANTICIPATOR MOTOR WILL NOT 1 
REMOVED DUE TO Q SPLITS; 1 
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"Q" SPLITS-FOUND PT GOV 1 
25% Q AT FLAT PITCH 1 
REMOVED DUE TO TORQUESPLITS 1 
15% TORQUE SPLIT IN FLIGHT 1 
REMOVED FOR "Q" SPLIT 1 
REMOVED FOR 20% Q-SPLITS #1 1 
REMOVED FOR 6 PERCENT 1 
REMOVED FOR ENGINE TORQUE 1 
REMOVED FOR FLAT PITCH TQ 1 
REMOVED FOR GOVNER DUE TO 1 
REMOVED FOR MID-RANGE 1 
REMOVED FOR POTENTIAL 1 
REMOVED FOR Q SPILTS 1 
15 - 18% TORQUE SPLIT #1 1 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLIT & 1 
10% TORQUE SPLIT, NP'S 95.5 1 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLITS #2 1 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLITS HIGH 1 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLITS WOULD 1 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLITS, WOULD 1 
10% TORQUE SPLIT 1 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLITS. IN 1 
REMOVED FOR Q SPLITS; 1 
REMOVED FOR Q-SPLIT 1 
REMOVED FOR Q-SPLIT, MOTOR 1 
REMOVED FOR Q-SPLITS 1 
REMOVED FOR RE-OCCURING 1 
REMOVED FOR SUSPECT 1 
REMOVED FOR SUSPECT CAUSE 1 
REMOVED FOR TORQ. SPLITS 1 
REMOVED FOR TORQUE 1 
REMOVED FOR TORQUE DISCREP 1 
#2 ENGINE LOW TORQUE SPLIT 1 
REMOVED FOR TORQUE SPLIT. 1 
#1 ENGINE HAS LOW TORQUEW 1 
#1 TQ TRANSDUCER SUSPECT 1 
REMOVED FOR TOUBLESHOOTING 1 
ANTICIPATOR MOTOR 1 
#1 ENG LOW TQ 4% SPLIT ON 1 
REMOVED FOR T-SHOOTING 1 
REMOVED FOR T-SHOOTING OF 1 
REMOVED FOR T-SHOOTING Q 1 
REMOVED PT GOV. FOR TORQUE 1 
REMOVED REPLACED DUE TO "Q" 1 
REMOVED S/N 211 DURING 1 
REMOVED SUSPECT FOR GROUND 1 
ANTICIPATOR CONTROL BOX 1 
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REMOVED TO CORRECT "Q" 1 
REMOVED TO TROUBLESHOOT Q 1 
RE-OCCURING Q-SPLITS THAT 1 
REPACLED FOR TORQUE SPLIT 1 
REPLACE DUE TO Q SPLITS. 1 
REPLACED #2 AIRFLOW 1 
REPLACED ANTICIPATOR 1 
REPLACED BECAUSE OF 1 
REPLACED CONTROL BOX DUE TO 1 
REPLACED DO TO Q-SPLITS. 1 
REPLACED DUE TO "Q" SPLITS 1 
REPLACED DUE TO 9% Q-SPLIT 1 
REPLACED DUE TO MID-RANGE Q 1 
REPLACED DUE TO Q SPLITS 1 
10% Q-SPLITS ON DECK FOUND 1 
REPLACED DUE TO Q SPLITS; 1 
REPLACED DUE TO QSPLIT #1 1 
ANTIC TORQUE SPLITS.  UR# 1 
#2 NP FLUCTUATES & Q SPLITS 1 
REPLACED DUE TO TORQUE NOT 1 
REPLACED DUE TO TORQUE SPLITS 1 
REPLACED F0R TORQUE SPLITS 1 
AIRFLOW MODULATOR WAS 1 
REPLACED FOR "Q" SPLITS, 1 
AIRCRAFT HAD TORQUE SPLITS 1 
REPLACED FOR Q SPLITS AT 1 
REPLACED FOR Q SPLITS. 1 
REPLACED FOR Q-SPLITS 1 
AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCING 1 
10% Q SPLITS ANYTIME 1 
20-25% TORQUE SPLIT IN THE 1 
REPLACED IN ORDER TO 1 
REPLACED PT GOVERNOR DUE TO 1 
REPLACED Q-TRANSDUCER FOR 1 
RPLACED FOR TORQUE SPLIT 1 
STICKY MOTOR CAUSING TORQUE 1 
SUSPECT ACTUATOR IS CAUSING 1 
SUSPECT AS CAUSE OF 1 
SUSPECT BOX CAUSING TORQUE 1 
SUSPECT CAUSE OF Q SPLIT 1 
SUSPECT CAUSE OF Q SPLITS. 1 
103% NG AND TORQUE SPLITS 1 
SUSPECT CAUSING OF TORQUE 1 
10 - 15 % TQ SPLITS 1 
SUSPECT COMPONENT IN TORQUE 1 
SUSPECT CONTROL BOX CAUSING 1 
SUSPECT FOR TQ SPLITS. 1 
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SUSPECT FUEL CONTROL IS 1 
SUSPECT FUEL PUMP IS 1 
SUSPECT IN HIGH SCALE 1 
SUSPECT POWER TURBINE 1 
SUSPECT STICKY AIRFLOW 1 
SUSPECT TORQUE SPLIT 1 
SUSPECT TORQUE SPLITS 1 
SUSPECTED BAD CAUSING Q 1 
SUSPECTED CAUSE OF 1 
20% TORQUE SPLITS @ FLAT 1 
SUSPECTED FOR CAUSING 1 
SUSPECTED OF CAUSING TORQUE 1 
SUSPECTED TO BE CAUSE OF 1 
SUSPECTED TO BE CAUSING Q 1 
ACTUATOR SUSPECTED OF 1 
SWAPPED OUT FOR Q SPLITS 1 
TBLSHOOT TQ SPLITS 1 
TBLSHOOTING TQ SPLIT 1 
TORCH SPLIT 1 
ACTUATOR OSCILATING WITH 1 
TORQ 1 
ACFT HAD FLAT PITCH TORQUE 1 
TORQ. SPLITS 1 
TORQEW SPLIT T-SHOOTING. 1 
TORQUE MATCHING PROBLEM. 1 
TORQUE PROBLEMS 1 
TORQUE SLIPTS AT MID RANGE 1 
TORQUE SPILT 1 
TORQUE SPITS 1 
#2 ENGINE HAD A 4-67 DEGREE 1 
TORQUE SPLIT #1 ENG SUSPECT 1 
TORQUE SPLIT AND THEN NO 1 
TORQUE SPLIT BETWEEN #1 ENG 1 
TORQUE SPLIT DURING GROUND 1 
TORQUE SPLIT PROBLEMS 1 
TORQUE SPLIT TO ZERO 1 
20% TORQUE SPLIT ON DECK 1 
TORQUE SPLIT; 1 
"CAUSED TORQUE SPLITS" 1 
TORQUE SPLITS - #1 AIRFLOW 1 
TORQUE SPLITS - AIRFLOW 1 
TORQUE SPLITS - POWER 1 
TORQUE SPLITS #1 ENGINE - 1 
TORQUE SPLITS #1 HIGH 1 
TORQUE SPLITS #1 LOW 1 
TORQUE SPLITS #1 SIDE LOW. 1 
TORQUE SPLITS #2 DRIVES 1 
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TORQUE SPLITS #2 ENG., 5-7% 1 
TORQUE SPLITS- #2 Q 1 
TORQUE SPLITS 10-15% HIGH 1 
90% Q SPLITS, MGT SPIKE 1 
TORQUE SPLITS 30% AT 20 FT 1 
TORQUE SPLITS AIRFLOW MOD 1 
TORQUE SPLITS AND FAILED 1 
TORQUE SPLITS AND LAGGING 1 
TORQUE SPLITS AND WILL NOT 1 
TORQUE SPLITS AND WORKING 1 
TORQUE SPLITS AT 40 TO 50 % 1 
8% TORQUE SPLITS. 1 
8% TORQUE SPLIT IN THE 1 
TORQUE SPLITS AT HIGH 1 
TORQUE SPLITS AT HIGH POWER 1 
TORQUE SPLITS AT LOW POWER 1 
7% TORQUE SPLITS ON DECK #1 1 
TORQUE SPLITS BETWEEN #1 1 
TORQUE SPLITS CAUSE BY 1 
TORQUE SPLITS CAUSES HIGH 1 
TORQUE SPLITS ERRONEOUS 1 
TORQUE SPLITS FOUND 1 
TORQUE SPLITS IN 20-30% 1 
TORQUE SPLITS IN FWD FLIGHT 1 
TORQUE SPLITS IN HIGH AND 1 
TORQUE SPLITS IN MID POWER 1 
6% TQ SPLIT 1 
TORQUE SPLITS IN MID RANGE, 1 
TORQUE SPLITS INDICATING 1 
TORQUE SPLITS LEAD AND LAG 1 
TORQUE SPLITS MOTOR 1 
TORQUE SPLITS OF 30%(AFTER 1 
TORQUE SPLITS ON #1 ENG 1 
TORQUE SPLITS ON DECK 1 
1.5% TORQUE SPLIT 1 
TORQUE SPLITS REMOVED FOR 1 
TORQUE SPLITS TROUBLE 1 
TORQUE SPLITS WITH ANTI-ICE 1 
TORQUE SPLITS WITH NUMBER 2 1 
TORQUE SPLITS WITH OEI 1 
TORQUE SPLITS WOULD SHOW UP 1 
TORQUE SPLITS(TORQUE WOULD 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, #1 ENGINE 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, #2 ENGINE 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, AIRFLOW 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, CAUSIING ENG 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, COULD NOT 1 
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TORQUE SPLITS, FOUND #2 ENG 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, FOUND NOT 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, LOW Q ON 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, MOTOR 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, NP WOULD 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, OPERATING 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, SLOW TO 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, THEN LOSS OF 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, TORQUE WILL 1 
TORQUE SPLITS, WOULD NOT 1 
20% TO SPLIT IN MIDRANGE. 1 
TORQUE SPLITS.  2% IN 1 
TORQUE SPLITS. - ANTIC 1 
TORQUE SPLITS. #2 ADJ SCREW 1 
TORQUE SPLITS. UNABLE TO 1 
TORQUE SPLITS/BAD 1 
TORQUE SPLITS/ENGINE 1 
TORQUE SPLITS; WOULD NOT 1 
TORQUES NOT HOLDING. 1 
TORQUES SPLITS 1 
TORQUES WOULD NOT HOLD 1 
TORQUES WOULD NOT MATCH 1 
TORQUESPLIT BELOW 50% MGB 1 
6% TORQUE SPLIT/WENT AWAY 1 
TORWUE SPLITS 1 
TQ SPILITS MID RANGE 1 
TQ SPLIT 1 
TQ SPLIT: #1 15-20% HIGHER 1 
"Q" SPLITS; COULD NOT 1 
TQ SPLITS 20% MIDRANGE 1 
TQ SPLITS AT FLAT PATCH 1 
TQ SPLITS AT MIDRANGE 1 
TQ SPLITS INHOVER 1 
TQ SPLITS. 1 
TQ. SPLITS. 1 
TRANSCUCER INDICATES 1 
TRANSDUCER WAS CAUSING 1 
TROBLESHOOTING FOR Q 1 
TROBLESHOOTING TORQUE 1 
TROUBLE SHOOTING "Q" SPLITS 1 
50% TO 70% TORQUE SPLITS. 1 
TROUBLESHOOT A TORQUE 1 
TROUBLESHOOT Q SPLITS 1 
TROUBLESHOOT Q-SPLIT 1 
TROUBLESHOOTING (TORQUE 1 
TROUBLESHOOTING FOR 1 
TROUBLESHOOTING FOR TORQUE 1 
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TROUBLESHOOTING LOW POWER. 1 
10% TORQUE SPLITS AT MIT 1 
TROUBLESHOOTING Q SPLITS #2 1 
TROUBLESHOOTING Q SPLITS. 1 
20% Q SPLITS WITH FLAT 1 
TROUBLESHOOTING TQ SPLITS 1 
TROUBLESHOT SYSTEM 1 
TROUBLSHOOTING TORQUE 1 
TROUBSHOOTING Q SPLIT 1 
T-SHOOTING FOR Q SPLITS 1 
UNABLE TO BALANCE 'Q'X 1 
3-7 PERCENT TORQUE SPLITS. 1 
UNIT CAUSES TORQUE SPLITS 1 
WATER FROM OVERHEAD ENTERED 1 
WHILE TROUBLESHOOTING 1 
WILL NOT FULLY OPEN, CAUSES 1 
WON'T ADJUST - TORQUE SPLIT 1 
WOULD NOT ACTUATE, CAUSING 1 
Grand Total 1107 
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 Appendix D: List and Count of Individual Malfunctions 
 
 
 MALFUNCTION (SPECIFIC REASON FOR REMOVAL) # of instances 
1 TORQUE SPLITS 1107 
2 FAILED POWER ASSURANCE 264 
3 TORQUE OSCILLATIONS/FLUCTUATIONS 159 
4 UNABLE TO CALIBRATE TRANSDUCER 146 
5 BLUE GREASE WASHOUT 145 
6 WOULD NOT OPEN 143 
7 ERRONEOUS TORQUE INDICATIONS 130 
8 TORQUE INDICATION ZERO 106 
9 COMPRESSOR STALLS 102 
10 TORQUE INDICATION FULL SCALE 96 
11 ACTUATOR RATCHETING 80 
12 ENGINE OSCILLATIONS 74 
13 FUEL LEAK 66 
14 REPAIR OR UPGRADE 64 
15 NONE 56 
16 CHIPS 54 
17 UNABLE TO ADJUST ANTICIPATOR 49 
18 UNABLE TO ADJUST NP 48 
19 VIBES 44 
20 #19 BEARING CHANGE 41 
21 HIGH SIDE FAILURE 40 
22 FOD COMPRESSOR 37 
23 FAILED OPS CHECK 37 
24 CONTROL BOX INOP 34 
25 POT LOOSE 33 
26 UNABLE TO PRIME 31 
27 FOD 30 
28 TORQUE SPIKES 26 
29 SPLINE WORN 26 
30 MOTOR INOP 26 
31 FROZEN MOTOR 26 
32 MOD FAILED OPS CHECK 23 
33 LOW SIDE FAILURE 23 
34 UNABLE TO TOP ENGINE 22 
35 AIR LEAK - TEMP COMP 21 
36 AIR LEAK - FUEL CONTROL 21 
37 FAULTY ADJ SCREW 21 
38 TORQUE DROPPED OFF LINE 20 
39 SLOW ACCELERATION 20 
40 FAULTY TRANSDUCER 20 
41 UNABLE TO ADJUST GROUND IDLE 19 
42 FAILED IBPT INSPECTION 19 
43 CORROSION 19 
 
90 
44 NO START 18 
45 MGT HIGH 18 
46 WILL NOT HOLD SETTINGS 17 
47 STICKING MODULATOR 17 
48 NO TORQUE INDICATION 17 
49 ACTUATOR WOULD NOT ROTATE 17 
50 TCTO T73110 16 
51 FUEL CONTROL LEAK 16 
52 ENGINE SURGES 16 
53 UNABLE TO ADJUST MOD 15 
54 TORQUE LOW 14 
55 NP HIGH 14 
56 MOD RATCHETING 14 
57 HOT START 14 
58 FAILED VIBRATION ANALYSIS 14 
59 TORQUE LAGS 13 
60 FAULTY SPRING 13 
61 FAULTY MOD 13 
62 ENGINE LAGS   13 
63 NO ACCELERATION 12 
64 NP LOW 11 
65 FUEL LEAK FROM DRAIN 11 
66 UNKNOWN 10 
67 AXIAL COMPRESSOR BLADE DAMAGE 10 
68 UNABLE TO ADJUST NG 10 
69 TORQUE PROBLEMS 10 
70 MISSING DATA PLATE 10 
71 LOW FUEL PRESSURE 10 
72 FAILED LEAK CHECK   10 
73 UNABLE TO ADJUST POTS 9 
74 TCTO 973100 9 
75 SHROUD REPLACEMENT 9 
76 OIL LEAK - OUTPUT SEAL 9 
77 OIL LEAK 9 
78 NP UNSTABLE 9 
79 MOD STICKING 9 
80 MOD ERRATIC OPS 9 
81 HYD FLUID CONTAMINATION 9 
82 ENGINE RESPONSE SLOW 9 
83 SUSPECT BEARING 8 
84 SMOKE 8 
85 OIL LEAK - STARTER 8 
86 NG LOW 8 
87 MOD LEAK 8 
88 WOULD NOT CLOSE 7 
89 UNABLE TO SET HIGH STOP 7 
90 ENGINE FLUCTUATIONS 7 
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91 TCTO 7 
92 SPLINE DAMAGE 7 
93 NR DROOP 7 
94 NP OVERSPEED 7 
95 BLOW BY 7 
96 UNABLE TO ADJUST NULL 6 
97 ANT MOTOR INOP 6 
98 UNABLE TO ADJUST ACTUATOR 6 
99 SPAN ADJUSTMENT INOP 6 
100 PTG BINDING 6 
101 OIL LEAK - AGB 6 
102 ENGINE SPOOLED DOWN 6 
103 NP FLUCTUATIONS 6 
104 ENGINE DROPPED OFF LINE 6 
105 FUEL PUMP DRIVE SPLINE WORN 6 
106 BINDING 6 
107 UNABLE TO CLOCK 5 
108 TORQUE LOSS 5 
109 DROPPED TRANSDUCER 5 
110 POWER LOSS 5 
111 BYPASS OF BLEED AIR 5 
112 NG UNSTABLE 5 
113 ENGINE FAILURE 5 
114 COMPRESSOR DAMAGE 5 
115 FAULTY O-RING 5 
116 FAULTY FUEL PUMP 5 
117 FAULTY ANTICIPATOR 5 
118 UNABLE TO ADJUST 4 
119 TORQUE HIGH 4 
120 STARTER GEAR SPLINES WORN 4 
121 ENGINE SLOW TO RESPOND 4 
122 EXCESSIVE OIL CONSUMPTION 4 
123 PT WHEEL BLADE OUT OF LIMITS 4 
124 OIL LEAK - TORQUEMETER HOUSING 4 
125 NP OSCILLATIONS 4 
126 CRACKED HOUSING 4 
127 ENGINE OVERTEMP 4 
128 MOD FLUCTUATES 4 
129 MGT SPIKE ON START 4 
130 LINKAGE WORN 4 
131 LEVER ROUGH 4 
132 JAM NUT INOP 4 
133 GT 326 4 
134 FAULTY PTG 4 
135 FUEL CONTROL SPLINE DAMAGED 4 
136 ENGINE PARAMETERS DROPPED 3 
137 UNABLE TO SET STOPS 3 
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138 ERRATIC TORQUE  3 
139 ANTICIPATOR MOTOR FROZEN 3 
140 UNABLE TO ADJUST HIGH STOP 3 
141 ACTUATOR INOP  3 
142 EXCESS GREASE 3 
143 TORQUE OUT OF LIMITS 3 
144 FLAME OUT 3 
145 ACTUATOR OVERROTATING 3 
146 ACTUATOR SLOW TO RESPOND 3 
147 THROTTLE ARM STIFF 3 
148 ENGINE SHUT DOWN IN FLT 3 
149 FAULTY BUSHING 3 
150 SHAFT FROZEN 3 
151 AIR LEAK - PTG 3 
152 PTG FAILURE 3 
153 BELLOWS FROZEN 3 
154 2 AND 3 BEARING BLOCKAGE 3 
155 OVERSPEED 3 
156 ELBOW FITTING THREADS DAMAGED 3 
157 OIL CONTAMINATION 3 
158 CRACKED INLET HOUSING 3 
159 ENGINE OVERSPEED 3 
160 NG ERRATIC 3 
161 MOD CYCLING 3 
162 MGT RESERVE LOW 3 
163 MGT AND NG HIGH 3 
164 FAULTY POT 3 
165 ARM CONTACTS HOUSING 3 
166 GT-328 3 
167 FUEL PUMP/CONTROL BINDING 3 
168 FAULTY TEMP COMP 2 
169 WOULD NOT ADVANCE PAST FLIGHT IDLE 2 
170 ANTICIPATOR MOTOR WOULD NOT RESPOND 2 
171 FUEL PUMP SPLINES DAMAGED 2 
172 BENT PINS 2 
173 FAULTY THERMOCOUPLE 2 
174 UNABLE TO ADJUST O/S LIMITER 2 
175 GASKET BLOWN 2 
176 FAUTLY GOVERNOR SPRING 2 
177 TRANSDUCER STICKING 2 
178 TRANSDUCER LEAKING OIL 2 
179 ARM STICKING 2 
180 TRANSDUCER LEAK 2 
181 HIGH 2 AND 3 BEARING PRESSURE 2 
182 TORQUE UNSTABLE 2 
183 CONNECTOR DAMAGE 2 
184 HOLDS PRESSURE 2 
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185 FOD AXAIL 2 
186 FAILED THERMOCOUPLE CHECK 2 
187 TEMP COMP STICKY 2 
188 ARM ROUGH 2 
189 ROUGH BEARINGS 2 
190 PTG FAILURE IN FLIGHT 2 
191 FUEL CONTROL BINDING 2 
192 CANNON PLUG DAMAGED 2 
193 POT DAMAGED 2 
194 OVERTORQUE 2 
195 OVERTEMP 2 
196 OIL LEAK - PLENUM 2 
197 FUEL CONTROL/PUMP CONTAIMINATION 2 
198 OIL LEAK - DIFFUSER 2 
199 LOCKING TANG DAMAGED 2 
200 LOW FUEL FLOW 2 
201 EXCESSIVE STARTER SPLINE WEAR 2 
202 ENGINE DIVERGENCE 2 
203 O/S LIMITER TRIPS EARLY 2 
204 O/S LIMIT SET TOO HIGH 2 
205 ENGINE DOES NOT SPOOL DOWN 2 
206 CANNON PLUG WOULD NOT LOCK 2 
207 FAILED TEST CELL CHECK FUEL CONTROL 2 
208 FUEL PUMP FITTING STRIPPED 2 
209 NO FUEL FLOW 2 
210 NO CUSHION ON CUTOFF 2 
211 MGT FLUCTUATIONS 2 
212 NG SPLITS 2 
213 NG SECTION SEIZED 2 
214 MODULATOR RING SHAFT EXCESS PLAY 2 
215 FUEL PUMP DROPPED 2 
216 FAILED 2 AND 3 BEARING INSPECTION 2 
217 COMPRESSOR BINDING 2 
218 MOD OSCILLATING 2 
219 FAILED THERMOCOUPLE TEST 2 
220 ZONE B EXCEEDANCE 1 
221 FAILED ANTICIPATOR SYSTEM 1 
222 ENGINE ERRATIC 1 
223 BELLOWS INOPERATIVE 1 
224 MISSING PLUG IN FUEL PUMP TAKEOFF GEAR 1 
225 CONTROL PUMP BINDING 1 
226 MOD OPENS EARLY 1 
227 DRIFT 1 
228 MGT UNSTABLE DURING START 1 
229 MGT SPLIT 1 
230 FAULTY O-RING AT T-FITTING 1 
231 BEARING ROUGH 1 
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232 NF FLUCTUATIONS 1 
233 NG DROPS 1 
234 NG DROPS OFFLINE 1 
235 FUEL PRESSURE FLUCTUATES 1 
236 NG FLUCTUATION 1 
237 NG HIGH 1 
238 CRACKED SPLINE 1 
239 NG OVERSPEED 1 
240 MGT LOW NG HIGH 1 
241 MGT LOW 1 
242 FAILED TEST CELL O/S LIMITIER 1 
243 NI DETENT 1 
244 FAULTY JAM NUT 1 
245 NO ACMS CARD SUBMITTED 1 
246 NO BLUE GREASE  1 
247 BROKEN BOLT 1 
248 NO ENGINE RESPONSE 1 
249 MGT ERRATIC 1 
250 NO NR DROP 1 
251 NO POWER 1 
252 BRACKET HOLE DAMAGED 1 
253 MGT DISCREPANCY 1 
254 BIMETALLIC STACK WOULD NOT EXTEND 1 
255 NP ACCELERATED 1 
256 FACE PLATE IS BROKE 1 
257 COMBUSTION DRAIN LINE LEAK 1 
258 FUEL LEAK - AGB 1 
259 FAULTY FUEL SCHEDULING 1 
260 METERING PIN FELL OUT 1 
261 METAL FOUND ON ENGINE DECK 1 
262 NPS DROP WHEN HEATER ON 1 
263 EXCESSIVE THROTTLE MOVEMENT 1 
264 NR LOW 1 
265 O/S LIMIITER OUT OF LIMTIS 1 
266 MAX STOP SCREW LOOSE 1 
267 O/S LIMITER FAULTY 1 
268 O/S LIMITER OUT OF LIMITS 1 
269 LOW SURGE/STALL MARGIN 1 
270 OIL CONSUMPTION OUT OF LIMITS 1 
271 FAILED BENCH TEST 1 
272 LOW STOP RUBBING ON PTG 1 
273 OIL LEAK - 1 AND 2 SEAL 1 
274 OIL LEAK - 1 BEARING 1 
275 OIL LEAK - 3 SEAL 1 
276 BENT CONNECTOR 1 
277 DRIVE GEAR SPLINE OUT OF LIMITS 1 
278 OIL LEAK - GARLOCK SEAL 1 
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279 FAULTY OUTPUT SEAL HOUSING O-RING 1 
280 OIL LEAK - OVERSPEED LIMITER 1 
281 LEVER TIGHT 1 
282 ADJUSTMENT SCREWS STRIPPED 1 
283 FAULTY FUEL PUMP MOUNT STUD 1 
284 OIL PUMP AXIAL OUT OF LIMITS 97216 1 
285 OIL STARVATION 1 
286 OIL STARVATION AND ENGINE SEIZURE 1 
287 OUT OF LIMITS 1 
288 OUT OF LIMITS AS PER STEP 2D3 1 
289 OUTPUT SEAL HOUSING DAMAGED 1 
290 OUTPUT SHAFT DAMAGED 1 
291 FAULTY STARTER/GENERATOR SPLINES 1 
292 OVERSPEED FAILURE 1 
293 OVERSPEED LIMITER BORE DAMAGED 1 
294 LEVER STEP 1 
295 OVERTEMP INDICATION 1 
296 FAULTY OVERSPEED CAM 1 
297 PER ARSC 1 
298 PER CWO FITZPATRICK 1 
299 PLASTIC SPLINE MELTED 1 
300 JP-8 1 
301 POT INOP 1 
302 ARM STIFF 1 
303 POT STICKS 1 
304 POTS ERRATIC 1 
305 POWER LAG 1 
306 FUEL PUMP MATING SURFACE CRACKED 1 
307 BYPASS PORT CRACKED 1 
308 PT WHEEL DAMAGED 1 
309 PT WHEEL HAS BLADE MISSING PARTS 1 
310 PTG ARM ROUGH 1 
311 FAULTY ENGINE START 1 
312 INTERNAL TORQUEMETER FAILURE 1 
313 PTG FAILURE   1 
314 INLET FITTING STRIPPED 1 
315 PTG SEIZES 1 
316 PTG SHAFT BINDING 1 
317 PTG TEE FITTING LOOSE 1 
318 RECALLED 1 
319 FROZEN CAM 1 
320 REPLACED INPUT SEAL 1 
321 ROUGH ACTUATION 1 
322 INCORRECT INSTALLATION 1 
323 ROUGH POINTER BEARING 1 
324 ROUGH SHAFT 1 
325 RUBBER PLUG ROUND IN AGB SPLINE 1 
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326 SEAL FAILURE 1 
327 SEND FOUND BETWEEN ASSEMBLIES 1 
328 SET SCREW FAULTY 1 
329 SHAFT BEARING CONTAIMINATED 1 
330 SHAFT BEARING ROUGH 1 
331 FP EXCEEDANCE 1 
332 SHAFT PLAY 1 
333 SHAFT WOBLE 1 
334 SHORT 1 
335 IMPENDING BYPASS 1 
336 SLOPE TOO STEEP 1 
337 BLEED PORT LEAK 1 
338 SLOW START 1 
339 SLUGGISH MOVEMENT 1 
340 ENGINE OIL LEAK - ANT ACTUATOR 1 
341 SNAP RING ON AGB 1 
342 EXCESS OIL FROM TAILPIPE VENT TUBE 1 
343 SPLINE BENT 1 
344 FAULTY CENTRIFUGAL IMPELLER 1 
345 SPLINE EXESSIVE PLAY 1 
346 SPLINE MELTED 1 
347 SPLINE SHAFT RATCHETING 1 
348 BEARING RATCHETING 1 
349 SPLINE WOULD NOT SPIN 1 
350 STARTER GEAR REPLACEMENT 1 
351 FOOT DAMAGED 1 
352 STARTER TIME OUT OF LIMITS 1 
353 STATIC 1 
354 STATOR SECTION SEIZED 1 
355 BUSHING WORN 1 
356 STRUT CLOGGED 1 
357 STUD STRIPPED 1 
358 ACCELERATION UNCONTROLLED 1 
359 SWIVEL ARM TIGHT 1 
360 ARM RATCHETING 1 
361 TCTO   1 
362 TCTO 972130 1 
363 TCTO 97216 1 
364 TCTO 973090 1 
365 DROPPED TEMP COMP 1 
366 CAM STIFF 1 
367 TEMP COMP HOUSING CRACKED 1 
368 TEMP COMP SEIZED 1 
369 IDLE DETENT STICKING 1 
370 FAILED TEST CELL PTG 1 
371 THROTTLE SHAFT PIN LOOSE 1 
372 BLEED AIR INOPERATIVE 1 
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373 TORQUE ERRATIC 1 
374 FAULTY BEARINGS 1 
375 BAD RECEPTICAL 1 
376 FLUCTUATING NG 1 
377 HOLE BURNED IN COMBUSTION LINER 1 
378 DROPPED FUEL CONTROL 1 
379 COMBUSTER T-STRIP DEGRADED 1 
380 ABNORMAL NOISES 1 
381 FLEX COUPLING SEPARATING 1 
382 DRAIN LINE LEAK 1 
383 BAD RHEOSTAT 1 
384 ANTICIPATOR SCREW THREADS STRIPPED 1 
385 HIGH SIDE STOP BOLT STRIPPED 1 
386 FUEL PUMP NOT PUMPING 1 
387 FUEL PUMP OVERBOARD DRAIN DUMPING FUEL 1 
388 GP SHROUD REPLACEMENT 1 
389 BLEED AIR GASKET BLOWN 1 
390 FIRE LIGHT 1 
391 FILTER DAMAGE 1 
392 UNABLE TO ADJUST FUEL PUMP 1 
393 BLOWING OIL 1 
394 GASKET WORN 1 
395 AIRFLOW MOD OSCILLATONS 1 
396 DOME WILL NOT ADJUST 1 
397 FAULTY TRIP LEVER 1 
398 ENGINEERING DISPOSITION 1 
399 UNABLE TO ADJUST NVG 1 
400 GASKET BROKEN 1 
401 UNABLE TO ADJUST OIL PRESS 1 
402 DROPPED PTG 1 
403 UNABLE TO ADJUST TORQUE   1 
404 UNABLE TO ARM OEI 1 
405 ACCELERATION FAULTY 1 
406 BLOWN FUSE 1 
407 DATA BASE UPDATE 1 
408 UNABLE TO RIG THROTTLE 1 
409 ENGINE RUNAWAY 1 
410 FUEL PUMP SEAL FAILURE 1 
411 UNABLE TO SHUT DOWN 1 
412 FUEL PUMP STUD STRIPPED 1 
413 UNCONTROLLABLE STARTS 1 
414 CRACKED STOP SCREW HOUSING 1 
415 UNUSUAL HUMM 1 
416 VENT COVER CRACKED 1 
417 FUEL PUMP STUD LOOSE 1 
418 VSI FLICKERING 1 
419 WEIGHTS STICKY 1 
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420 BROKEN BOLT COMBUSTION CAN 1 
421 WORN BUSHINGS 1 
422 FUEL PUMP SHAFT WORN 1 
423 FUEL PUMP SHAFT ROUGH 1 
424 ACTUATOR ARM BINDING 1 
425 ZERO TORQUE 1 
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